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Racial minorities endure unfair treatment in our legal system on a variety of different outcomes, 
jury decisions in particular. Courts and researchers propose increasing diversity in juries as a 
method for improving jury deliberations and reducing racially biased outcomes for minority 
defendants (Peters v. Kiff, 1972; Sommers 2006). In the present research, I investigated the 
impact of diversity on the quality of deliberations, as defined by both sensitivity to case strength, 
and by more high quality contributions to deliberations. In the first study, both minority group 
members and majority group members provided more, higher quality, contributions when they 
deliberated in diverse juries than when they deliberated in non-diverse juries. However, there 
was no evidence that diversity increased sensitivity to case strength. In the second study, I 
manipulated power and wealth using a minimal groups paradigm (MGP), and then created 
groups that were either diverse or homogenous on this dimension. Diverse juries were more 
likely to acquit the defendant compared to the non-diverse low wealth/power juries. In addition, 
jurors deliberating in diverse juries provided more high quality contributions than those 
deliberating in non-diverse juries. Thus, diversity’s benefits extend to minority jurors and wealth 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
Numerous jury decisions have been second-guessed based on possibilities that racial bias 
entered into some level of the jury decisions. One early example was the case of Norris v. 
Alabama in which the Supreme Court heard the appeal of one of the nine “Scottsboro Boys” 
convicted by an all-White jury of raping two White women. The jury convicted all nine boys 
despite convincing evidence pointing towards their innocence, raising questions about the lack of 
diversity on the jury and what impact that might have had on the decision-making process. 
Particularly concerning was the fact that no African-American had ever sat on a jury in 
Scottsboro, Alabama. Eventually, the conviction was reversed, and it became clear that the 
Supreme Court would no longer tolerate the total exclusion of African-Americans from serving 
on juries. The Norris case was reversed in 1935, so we may be tempted to believe that problems 
stemming from a lack of diversity on juries are a part of this country’s past. A more recent case 
confirms the persistence of issues with jury diversity. Allen Snyder was accused of killing a 
White man in 1995. Although five out of thirty-six prospective jurors were African-American, he 
was tried by an all-White jury. All five African-Americans were removed from the jury by the 
prosecution via peremptory challenges. However, when Snyder appealed his conviction in 2008, 
the Court ruled that he had not sufficiently demonstrated that the prosecution’s use of the 
peremptory challenges was discriminatory.  
More recent controversial jury outcomes have also been attributed to the lack of diversity 
on juries. Even more recently, George Zimmerman was accused of killing a Black teenager who 
was in possession of only a candy bar. While Zimmerman admitted to shooting the teenager, he 
claimed self-defense under Florida’s stand your ground law. An all-female jury with only one 
non-white member eventually acquitted Zimmerman of murder. The controversial outcome of 





Zimmerman. Outcomes of cases tried by homogenous juries tend to violate people’s perceptions 
of fairness and contribute to outrage over unpopular verdicts (Fairchild & Cowan, 1997; 
Sommers, 2006). 
Although there are disagreements over the correctness of famous verdicts, there seems to 
be agreement among both the public and the courts that diversity on juries is important and 
valuable. Chief Justice Marshall noted in Peters v. Kiff (1972) “When any large and identifiable 
segment of the community is excluded from jury service, the effect is to remove from the jury 
room qualities of human nature and varieties of human experience the range of which is 
unknown, and perhaps unknowable.” The present research is designed to shed light on the effects 







Chapter 2: Racial Bias in the Legal System 
Minorities have a long history of mistreatment in the criminal justice system (for a 
review, see Hunt, 2015; see also Barnes & Kingsnorth, 1996; Williams, Demuth, & Holcomb, 
2007). Despite the implementation of various interventions attempting to eliminate ethnic bias in 
the justice system, minority defendants are still convicted more often, awarded longer sentences, 
and sentenced to death more often than White defendants (Mustard, 2001; Williams, et al., 
2007). These disparities remain even after controlling for factors such as differential arrest rates 
(Sorensen, Hope & Stemen, 2003). In a study of single drug felonies in California, African-
Americans were more likely to receive a prison term than Whites, and those prison terms were 
longer those received by Whites (Barnes & Kingsnorth, 1996). The inequalities in punishment 
are most consequential in capital cases. One study of the outcomes in 2,000 murder cases in 
Georgia found that Black defendants were 4.2 times more likely than White defendants to be 
sentenced to death (Baldus, Pulaski & Woodworth, 1983). This analysis controlled for 230 
variables including prior convictions, yet the disparity in death sentences remained extreme. 
Another set of analyses of death penalty cases documented this same pattern of racial disparity 
for Black defendants when the victim of murder was White (Bowers, 1984).  
Racial disparities appear when examining exonerations as well. Additionally, the 
National Registry of Exonerations reports that almost half (46.4%) of exonerees are Black and 
60.4% of exoneration cases featured a minority defendant, a percentage that is much higher than 
the demographic percentage of minorities in the United States (National Registry of 
Exonerations, 2016). When looking at DNA exoneration cases the overrepresentation of 
minorities grows even higher, with 70% of exonerated individuals being members of a racial or 





Even within minority groups, defendants can face harsher outcomes based on stereotypes 
associated with their appearance. Researchers obtained pictures of African-American defendants 
from real death-eligible cases in Philadelphia that had advanced to the penalty phase and had 
participants rate how stereotypically Black the faces were. They found that jurors were more 
likely to sentence to death defendants who appeared more stereotypically Black than defendants 
who had less phenotypically African facial features (Eberhardt, Davies, Purdie-Vaughns, & 
Johnson, 2006). These racial and ethnic disparities in punishment persist despite legal rulings 
intended to increase diversity in juries and reduce racial bias in decision-making.   
The clear and prevalent disadvantages experienced by racial minorities in the justice 
system inspired research examining what role racial bias in jury decisions might play in these 
punishment disparities. Researchers have examined the problems caused by prejudice and biases, 
primarily using jury simulation methodologies. In the majority of these studies, participants 
either read a written summary of trial evidence or watch a videotaped reenactment of a trial and 
then render verdicts or provide sentencing outcomes for Black (vs. White) defendants (Sweeney 
& Haney, 1992).  Four meta-analyses have been performed to aggregate the psychology research 
on bias toward outgroup defendants. In many of these studies, bias toward outgroup defendants 
has been defined as harsher judgments for defendants who are members of a different 
racial/ethnic group than participants than for defendants who are members of participants’ 
ingroup. The earliest meta-analysis found a small but significant outgroup bias effect in mock 
juror verdicts and guilt ratings (Sweeney & Haney, 1992). This meta-analysis, however, only 
examined White mock jurors’ guilt judgments for Black (vs. White) defendants. A second meta-
analysis found no evidence of bias towards outgroup defendants in mock juror studies (Mazzella 





and defined racial bias as bias toward Black defendants. A third meta-analysis found a small but 
significant effect for bias against outgroup defendants (Mitchell, Haw, Pfeifer, & Meissner, 
2005). This meta-analysis also found larger effect sizes for sentencing decisions than for 
verdicts.  The most recent meta-analysis examining individual characteristics that impact legal 
decisions found an overall outgroup bias effect, but upon examination of moderators, found that 
it was driven by White jurors discriminating against Hispanic defendants, not Black defendants 
(Devine & Caughlin, 2014).  
Individual studies also provide evidence of bias toward outgroup defendants.  When 
mock jurors were allowed the opportunity to assign punishment for defendants, they awarded 
longer sentences and awarded the death penalty more frequently to outgroup defendants than to 
ingroup defendants (Forsterlee, Forsterlee, Horowitz, & King, 2006; Lynch & Haney, 2009).  
There is a consistent pattern of mock jurors rendering higher guilt ratings for outgroup 
defendants than ingroup defendants in recent mock juror simulations (Bucolo & Cohn, 2010; 
Espinoza & Willis-Esqueda, 2008; Hodson, Hooper, Dovidio, & Gaertner, 2005).  
Most mock juror studies operationalize outgroup defendant bias as White mock jurors’ 
harsher guilt ratings for Black defendants as compared to White defendants. Recently, however, 
there has been more of an emphasis on including a greater variety of minority groups in mock 
jury research. When researchers have tested bias towards other minority groups, the pattern of 
White mock juror bias towards minority defendants remains (Adams, Bryden & Griffith, 2011; 
Espinoza & Willis-Esqueda, 2008). White mock jurors’ are more likely to convict, award harsher 
guilt ratings and longer sentences when judging Hispanic, Mexican-American, and Middle 
Eastern defendants than when they are deciding cases with a White defendant (Adams et al., 





have had minority participants render judgments for White defendants in mock juror studies. The 
Mitchell et al. (2005) meta-analysis revealed that the outgroup bias effect was larger for minority 
participants rendering judgments for White defendants, than for White participants passing 
judgment on minority defendants. Additionally, the most recent meta-analysis examining racial 
bias found the largest outgroup bias effects for Whites making judgments about Hispanic 
defendants (Devine & Caughlin, 2014).  
Although there is relative consensus that bias towards outgroup defendants, particularly 
toward minorities, can and does occur throughout the literature on mock juror bias, there are 
several studies in the literature that have not found bias toward outgroup defendants in mock 
juror verdicts (Foley & Pigott, 2002; Mazzella & Feingold, 1994). Some studies have even 
documented “reverse discrimination” effects by which mock jurors are more lenient towards 
outgroup defendants than ingroup defendants (Foley & Pigott, 2002). There is a substantial 
literature suggesting that the modern emergence of political correctness as a desirable trait causes 
people to deliver unbiased responses, particularly when they are aware of the potential for their 
responses to be perceived as prejudiced (Carver, Glass & Katz, 1978). Although public prejudice 
has decreased, biases about other racial and ethnic groups continue to lurk under the surface and 
enter into decision-making unbeknownst to decision-makers (Gaertner & Dovidio, 1986). These 
more subtle forms of prejudice predict which situations will be more likely to evoke biased 
decision-making.  
The patterns of racial bias in mock jury decisions mirror the study of prejudice in more 
basic social psychological research. Dovidio (2001) describes the evolution of the study of 
prejudice as occurring in three distinct periods or “waves.” During the first wave, researchers 





during this period devoted to identifying and evaluating prejudice and determining its causes 
(Dovidio, 2001; Gilbert, 1951). From this first stage of prejudice research, the field evolved from 
its view of prejudice as an abnormality, to the view of prejudice as a part of normal thinking 
(Dovidio, 2001). For example, Allport (1954) viewed prejudice as a result of an ingroup 
categorization process by which people differentiate between ingroup and outgroup members, 
with hostility towards outgroups being part of the process of identifying more with one’s 
ingroup. The social identity perspective on prejudice (Tajfel & Turner, 1979) also emphasized 
the role of outgroup discrimination in establishing one’s identity in an ingroup. The third wave of 
prejudice research was devoted to discovering and measuring each individual’s level of implicit 
bias (Dovidio, 2001). During this phase researchers developed measures of implicit bias such as 
the Implicit Association Task (IAT), which measured individuals’ level of association with 
White and Black faces and positive and negative stimuli (Greenwald, McGhee, & Schwartz, 
1998). When taking the IAT, many White participants responded more quickly to positive traits 
when they were provided Black primes with the reverse being true for negative traits (Dovidio, 
Kawakami, Johnson, Johnson, & Howard, 1997). 
The second “wave” described by Dovidio (2001) may be the most helpful in 
understanding discrepancies in findings of prejudice. During this period there was a rise in the 
importance placed on political correctness and egalitarian principles. Prejudice did not disappear, 
but instead it took a more subtle form (Dovidio & Gaertner, 1998; Gaertner & Dovidio, 1986). 
The aversive racism perspective is consistent with the notion that although many people 
considered themselves to be egalitarian, they still harbored negative feelings toward outgroup 
members. Often White individuals would not self-report prejudice toward Black individuals; 





responses toward black individuals (Gaertner & Dovidio, 1986). Aversive racism was first 
demonstrated by examining helping behaviors. Using the bystander paradigm (Latane & Darley, 
1968), researchers developed a method of testing theories on aversive racism. Participants 
encountered an individual in need of help. In some conditions there were other bystanders 
present; in others, the participants were alone. Participants expressed no bias toward the Black 
victim in the less ambiguous conditions when they were the only available helpers; when other 
people were around, they helped the White victim twice as often as they helped the Black victim 
(Gaertner & Dovidio, 1977). When the situation was more ambiguous in terms of whether the 
participant should intervene because of the presence of bystanders, they were more likely to 
discriminate against the Black victim. Later research extended this theory to hiring 
recommendations; when a candidate’s criteria were a more questionable match for the position, 
participants favored the White applicant over the Black applicant (Dovidio & Gaertner, 2000). 
Concerns about appearing politically correct are consistent with findings of race salience 
in mock juror research (Sommers & Ellsworth, 2000; 2001). When racial issues are made salient 
during the course of a trial, mock jurors are less likely to exhibit bias toward outgroup 
defendants in their verdict decisions (Sommers & Ellsworth, 2000; 2001). The phenomena of 
race salience suggests that mock jurors, when confronted with a trial simulation that makes 
issues of race salient, are able to prevent their biases from affecting their interpretation of the 
evidence. Race salience fits with these modern theories of prejudice, which maintain that people 
will not express prejudice in situations that alert them to the potential for their actions to be 
perceived as biased (Gaertner & Dovidio, 1986; Pearson, Dovidio & Gaertner, 2009; Saucier, 
Miller & Doucet, 2005). Yet when racial issues call their attention to the possibility of 





As the aversive racism perspective would predict, ambiguous situations tend to be more 
likely to evoke evidence of bias toward outgroup defendants (Gaertner & Dovidio, 1986). For 
example, when the prosecution brought in evidence later ruled inadmissible by the judge, mock 
jurors were more likely to exhibit bias towards outgroup defendants (Hodson, et al., 2005). The 
ability to make race neutral explanations can also increase attorneys’ use of racially motivated 
peremptory challenges (Baldus, Woodworth, Zuckerman, Weiner, & Broffitt, 2001; Clark, 
Boccaccini, Caillouet, & Chaplin, 2007; Rose, 1999; Sommers & Norton, 2007); attorneys make 
racially biased decisions in how they use their peremptory challenges, but few mention race 







Chapter 3: Jury Diversity 
The U.S. Courts have a long history of addressing problems with racial and ethnic 
minorities being denied the ability to serve on juries. As early as 1879, the courts struck down 
laws restricting jury service to Whites (Neal v. Delaware, 1880; Strauder v. West Virginia, 
1879). Property and income requirements for jury service, however, had the impact of effectively 
maintaining all-White membership on juries for a number of years. Swain v. Alabama (1965) 
was the first instance of the Court expressly prohibiting the use of racially biased peremptory 
challenges to remove African-Americans from juries, yet the standard set in this case required 
demonstrating a pattern of minorities’ exclusion from juries from across the entire county. In 
Batson v. Kentucky (1986), the Supreme Court highlighted its increasing concerns about racial 
bias, reflecting the societal embrace of egalitarian principles. In this ruling, the Court recognized 
that racially biased jurors had the potential to impact verdicts (Batson v. Kentucky, 1986).  
Prior to the Batson ruling peremptory challenges did not require any justification or 
approval from a judge. Prosecutors were (and remain) far more likely to exclude Black venire 
members than are defense attorneys (Baldus, et al., 2001). As a result, prosecutors were 
removing minority jurors, often when the defendant was Black. The Batson Court sought to 
remedy this problem by prohibiting the use of peremptory challenges to exclude members of 
ethnic and racial minority groups from juries, and instituting a procedure by which to challenge 
discriminatory peremptory challenges. Critics of the Batson ruling contend that the challenge 
relies on a flawed two-step process to prevent discrimination. First, an attorney must raise the 
issue of a racially motivated peremptory challenge. Then, if the judge agrees that the challenge 
was based on the potential juror’s racial group membership, the attorney has the opportunity to 





neutral justification as legitimate and allow the peremptory challenge, or reject the explanation as 
prohibit the challenge.  
Despite the protections afforded by Batson, racial bias remains in the exercise of 
peremptory challenges (Baldus et al., 2001; Clark et al., 2007; Rose, 1999). Although the Batson 
ruling was intended to curb the use of peremptory challenges to discriminate against minority 
group members, the procedure introduced in Batson does not successfully eliminate racially 
motivated peremptory use. Archival research on peremptory challenge use after the Batson 
ruling has determined that very few of Batson challenges are successful, allowing prosecutors to 
use peremptory challenges to prevent minorities from serving on juries without consequence 
(Melilli, 1996).  As evidenced by recent studies on peremptory challenge use, neutral 
explanations for racially motivated decisions often come naturally to decision-makers and are 
easy to provide (Sommers & Norton, 2007). In fact, warnings about the illegality of using 
peremptory challenges to remove prospective jurors based on gender actually increased the 
elaborative nature of these justifications, while failing to eliminate the use of gender as factor for 
removal (Norton, Sommers & Brauner, 2007). As a result, prosecutors are often able to provide 
convincing race-neutral reasons for making peremptory challenges, rendering the vast majority 
of Batson challenges unsuccessful (Melilli, 1996).  
The Batson standard was extended in Miller-El v. Dretke (2005), which allowed a 
petitioner to include factors outside the case when protesting discrimination in a prospective 
juror removal. The extension of Batson was later upheld in Snyder v. Louisiana (2008), which 
involved an appeal reconsidered in light of the Miller-El decision. Both court decisions built 
upon the Batson ruling, but neither significantly enhanced the effectiveness of prohibitions on 





Court reversed the dismissal of the petitioner’s challenge based on evidence of racism in the 
prosecutor’s notes, obtained years after the trial took place. 
The rulings in these court cases were intended to eliminate racial bias in peremptory 
challenge use, but racially biased peremptory challenges remain (Clark et al., 2007; Rose, 1999). 
It is difficult to prove discrimination based on a single removal, and including factors outside the 
case does not provide adequate information about an attorney’s motivation. As a result of the 
inability of Batson to successfully prevent discrimination in allowing minority venire members 
to serve on juries, prosecutors continue to possess the ability to remove minority venire members 
from jury service. For minority defendants, this practice may help exacerbate the disadvantages 
they suffer in the legal system compared to White defendants.   
Empirical research largely supports the courts’ assumption that jury diversity mitigates 
problems with racial bias in juries. Early research found differences in the quality of 
deliberations as a function of jury composition that varied on race and attitudinal variables 
(Cowan, Thompson, & Ellsworth, 1984; Fitzgerald & Ellsworth, 1984). In states that allow the 
death penalty, potential jurors are screened for bias against the death penalty through voir dire. 
The overwhelming majority of death-qualified jurors tend to be White men (Fitzgerald & 
Ellsworth, 1984). Therefore it is likely that death-qualified juries are juries with a very high 
proportion of White men. A qualitative analysis comparing deliberations in mixed (not death-
qualified) juries to juries that were death-qualified showed that mock jurors in mixed juries had a 
more thorough understanding of the case facts and verdict criteria than did those in death-
qualified juries (Cowan, et al., 1984). Death-qualified juries were also more likely to convict the 





Because death-qualified juries are more conviction-prone (Cowan et al., 1984) and also 
feature a disproportionate number of White men (Fitzgerald & Ellsworth, 1984), it is likely that 
an increase in White men on a jury could increase the likelihood that the jury is conviction-
prone. An evaluation of sentencing decisions by unanimous mock juries found that juries with a 
high proportion of White men would be more likely to sentence a defendant to death than would 
juries with a low proportion of White men (Lynch & Haney, 2011). For the White defendant, 
there was little difference between the death sentences awarded (60% for juries with fewer than 
two White men vs. 63% for juries with two or more White men). However, in cases with a Black 
defendant, 68% of juries with fewer than two White men gave a death sentence, whereas 86% of 
juries with two or more White men sentenced the Black defendant to death (Lynch & Haney, 
2011). Thus, the White men’s tendency to sentence a defendant to death was restricted to cases 
with Black defendants. These findings indicate that the addition of minorities to juries may 
reduce their tendency to punish minority individuals more harshly. 
 Deliberations in diverse juries are also higher quality than deliberations in homogenous 
juries (Sommers, 2006). Prior to deliberations, White jurors were less likely to vote guilty for the 
Black defendant when they anticipated deliberating in a diverse jury than when they would be 
deliberating in a homogenous jury. The beneficial effects of diversity were mostly explained by 
higher quality contributions from the White participants in diverse juries. White participants 
mentioned more relevant case facts, made fewer factual errors, and discussed the possibility of 
racism to come into play more when deliberating in a diverse jury. The researchers used length 
of deliberation, number of case facts discussed, number of inaccuracies, number of mentions of 
possible missing pieces of evidence, and the mention of race to evaluate quality of deliberations 





More basic psychological research finds support for diversity’s benefits in that racially 
heterogeneous groups outside the courtroom outperform homogenous ones on a number of tasks 
(McLeod, Lobel, & Cox, 1996; Sommers, Warp & Mahoney, 2008). For example, the 
anticipation of participating in a racially diverse group increased Whites’ information-processing 
levels as compared to when they were told they would be participating in an all-White group 
(Sommers et al., 2008). The study of diversity has revealed substantial benefits in terms of 
improved group performance (Phillips, Mannix, Neale & Gruenfeld, 2004), and these advantages 
are consistent among varied definitions of diversity (Gruenfeld, Mannix, Williams, & Neale, 
1996; Stasser, Stewart, & Wittenbaum, 1995; Watson, Kumar, & Michaelsen, 1993). 
There are some mixed results in terms of diversity’s benefits and improved performance 
for diverse groups. As diversity is difficult to operationalize and investigate, and some reviews 
have concluded that it is difficult to recommend diversity based on the existing literature 
(Webber & Donohue, 2001; Kochan et al., 2003). Although it seems logical that diverse groups 
would benefit from the varied perspectives of the group members (Nemeth, 1986), empirical 
research does not consistently support this view. Diversity does not benefit a group in terms of 
group cohesion, and conflict is more likely to occur in diverse groups (De Dreu & Weingart, 
2003). Moreover, some research indicates the need for congruence between social and 
knowledge ties to reap the benefits of diversity. For example, Phillips et al. (2004) found that for 
diverse groups to be successful each member of the group must have role that is consistent with 
the rest of the group’s expectations. Overall, however, the research on diversity in both group 






To explain the results from Sommers (2006) the researchers hypothesized that two related 
theories might explain diversity’s benefits in terms of White mock jurors’ motivation to avoid 
prejudice. The theory of race salience describes the reduction of prejudice exhibited by White 
mock jurors when racial issues are brought up in the context of a trial (Sommers & Ellsworth, 
2001). The researchers in Sommers (2006) proposed that the presence of minority jurors may 
have raised concerns about racial issues for White mock jurors, causing them to enter the 
deliberations expecting to discuss racial issues. The diversity benefit could also be explained by 
the finding that White individuals are often motivated to engage in higher levels of thinking 
when they are evaluating targets who are minority group members (Sargent & Bradfield, 2004; 
White & Harkins, 1994). Researchers have termed this phenomenon the “watchdog effect,” 
describing the majority group individuals as watchdogs guarding against potential prejudice by 
themselves or others when evaluating a stigmatized target (Fleming, Petty & White, 2005). This 
benefit in cognitive processing occurred only when participants expected to discuss race-relevant 
issues, lending further support to the proposition that Whites are acting as watchdogs to guard 
against the potential for prejudice to enter their decisions (Fleming et al., 2005). 
The motivation of White individuals to avoid appearing prejudiced may explain some of 
diversity’s benefits, specifically for why White individuals tend to benefit from diversity. When 
asked to consider applicants for a job, participants were more sensitive to the strength of a Black 
applicant’s resume than they were to the strength of a White applicant’s resume (Fleming et al., 
2005). Similarly, people were more convinced by a strong argument from a stigmatized source 
than a non-stigmatized source but less convinced by a weak argument if the source of the 
statement was stigmatized (Petty et al., 1999; White & Harkins, 1994), although this effect may 





previous research, which also demonstrated that people provide more polarized evaluations of 
stigmatized individuals (Hass et al., 1991; Linville & Jones, 1980). The watchdog concept has 
mainly been tested by examining the degree to which evaluations of stigmatized targets are 
polarized, indicating a more thorough thinking pattern for non-stigmatized individuals (Fleming 
et al., 2005).  
Research has also established the presence of the watchdog effect into the courtroom. 
Researchers manipulated the strength of alibi evidence in a criminal case and had mock jurors 
evaluate the strength of the case. Mock jurors were more sensitive to evidence strength when the 
defendant in the case was Black than when the defendant was White (Sargent & Bradfield, 
2004). The watchdog effect also provides an explanation for the findings that making racial 
issues salient at trial can decrease bias against minority defendants (Sommers & Ellsworth, 2000; 
2001). Although the watchdog effect appears more prominently for individuals who are very low 
in prejudice on several scales, this tendency to protect stigmatized individuals by more 
thoroughly processing messages may not be confined to egalitarian-minded individuals. 
The watchdog effect relies on sensitivity to argument strength as an indicator of level of 
processing, consistent with the tenets of dual-process models of persuasion. Both the Heuristic-
Systematic Model (HSM) and the Elaboration Likelihood Model (ELM) are based on the theory 
that people process information in different ways depending on their resources and motivation 
(Chaiken, 1980; Petty & Cacioppo, 1979). Although there are subtle differences between the 
HSM and the ELM, both propose a dual-process cognitive strategy by which people process 
messages more or less thoroughly depending on the situation. The two models also concur that 
people will process a persuasive message more critically and more in-depth when they possess 





rely on when they are evaluating an argument. At lower processing levels, people are more likely 
to rely on heuristic cues to decision-making such as consensus implies correctness, whereas at 
higher processing levels people will systematically evaluate the quality of the persuasive 
arguments (Chaiken, 1980). Similarly, the ELM focuses on whether people use a central (or 
more systematic) processing route in which they pay attention to the quality of the arguments in 
the message (like the HSM’s systematic processing), or whether they evaluate an argument by 
relying on peripheral cues such as source credibility or attractiveness (Petty & Cacioppo, 1979).  
There are a variety of reasons why people might be motivated to take a more thorough 
approach to evaluating an argument. Early work on persuasion used personal involvement to 
increase participants’ motivation to process a message (Petty & Cacioppo, 1979). For instance, a 
typical persuasion study had undergraduate students read arguments supporting a proposal for 
final comprehensive exams being considered at their university, which would be instituted while 
the participants were still attending the university or once the students had already graduated. 
When the students read the self-relevant article (i.e., the proposed exams would be instituted 
while they were still in school) they processed arguments more systematically when making their 
decision. When the message was less self-relevant, participants took a more peripheral route and 
relied on more heuristic cues to process the message. When people process information more 
systematically, they differentiate between strong and weak arguments. According to the 
Elaboration Likelihood Model (ELM) this occurs because cognitively elaborating on strong 
arguments strengthens them further, and elaborating on weak arguments weakens them further 
(Cacioppo et al., 1986). In the case of the watchdog effect, the presence of minorities on the jury 






Chapter 4: Deliberations 
To resolve the issues presented by biased jury decisions and ensure fairer outcomes for 
minority defendants, the courts and researchers have proposed a variety of protections. These 
prescribed solutions include diverse or representative juries, deliberations, and warnings about 
fairness and bias. Ideally, deliberations alone would have the ability to prevent bias toward 
minority defendants in jury verdicts. The U.S. court system relies on jury groups on the 
assumption that they are better than individuals in catching and correcting errors (Apodaca et al. 
v. Oregon, 1972).  In the court decision in Apodaca, a case that dealt with the question of the 
necessity of unanimity in jury decisions, the court maintained that deliberating jury groups would 
outperform individual jurors through error correction and increased memory.  
Some research supports that jury groups will produce more accurate decisions than 
individual jurors (Clark, Stephenson, & Kniveton, 1990; Patry, 2008; Vollrath, Sheppard, Hinsz, 
& Davis, 1989).  In mock jury research studies, mock jurors who deliberated were less likely to 
rely on peripheral, superficial cues such as defendant attractiveness when making verdict 
decisions than those who rendered individual verdicts (Patry, 2008). Additionally, mock jurors 
evaluating evidence in groups made fewer memory errors and exhibited better memory 
performance than individuals (Clark et al., 1990; Vollrath et al., 1989). Moreover, items that 
jurors remembered incorrectly were more likely to be corrected if they were brought up during a 
jury deliberation (Pritchard & Keenan, 2002).  Juries were also more successful in adhering to 
judicial instructions to exclude inadmissible testimony after deliberations than they were prior to 
deliberations (Kerwin & Shaffer, 1994). In some research, deliberating juries even delivered less 
racially biased verdicts than did individual jurors (Adams, et al., 2011; Bothwell, Pigott, Foley, 





Basic social and cognitive research also suggests that deliberations should improve fact-
finding. Memory pooling, defined as improvements in memory due to collaborative 
remembering, suggests that groups remembering events tend to exhibit improved performance on 
memory tasks compared to individuals (Clark, Hori, Puthnan & Martin, 2000 ; Stephenson, 
Clark, & Wade, 1986; Weldon & Bellinger, 1997; Yarmey & Morris, 1998).  Some research 
even suggests that the more people involved in the group remembering, the more accurate the 
group recall (Stephenson et al., 1986; Weldon & Bellinger, 1997). 
Conversely, other research suggests that deliberations impair juror decision-making 
(Kramer, Kerr, & Carroll, 1990; Lynch & Haney, 2009; Ruva, McEvoy, & Bryant, 2007). In 
pretrial publicity (PTP) research, deliberations have failed to correct for memory errors and 
sometimes heightened PTP’s prejudicial impact (Kramer, et al., 1990; Ruva, et al., 2007). 
Sometimes this benefit was restricted to more peripheral details, with deliberations failing to 
improve memory for critical evidence (Pritchard & Keenan, 2002). A more recent study 
examining instructions designed to eliminate the negative effects of PTP found that deliberations 
were not effective in eliminating jurors’ use of PTP in verdict decisions (Ruva & Guenther, 
2015). 
 Research on collective memory also suggests that group deliberation does not always 
result in higher quality outcomes. Some memory research suggests that people recalling events 
together will experience collaborative inhibition, defined as the reduction in recall of a group 
remembering together compared to combining individuals’ own account (Weldon, Blair, & 
Huebsch, 2000). Social loafing may account for some of the reduction in recall in groups, 
although it does not account for all of the impairment (Weldon et al., 2000). Stasser (1988) 





recounting shared memories rather than unique memories, lessening each members’ unique 
contributions. Additionally, participation in collective remembering (i.e., the actual conversation 
in which people discuss the event) can impair individuals’ ability to accurately remember the 
event (Stone, Barnier, Sutton, & Hutton, 2010).  
Most important, the majority of the research does not suggest that deliberations will 
diminish or eliminate bias toward outgroup defendants. In fact, deliberations may cause jurors to 
become more punitive toward minority defendants (Lynch & Haney, 2009). In one study, 
participants watched a videotaped reenactment of a death penalty trial, reported pre-deliberation 
judgments of mock jurors, and then deliberated in juries. The participants were instructed that the 
defendant had already been convicted and that they were to decide sentencing. Participants 
sentenced 57% of Black defendants and 52% of White defendants to death before deliberations, 
a non-significant difference. After deliberations, mock jurors sentenced 71% of Black defendants 
to death, only awarding the death penalty for 61% of White defendants. The researchers 
determined that these effects were mediated by the misuse of penalty phase information such as 
mitigating and aggravating factors (Lynch & Haney, 2009). Thus, jury deliberations may not 
serve as an adequate safeguard against racial bias and may in fact increase unfair judgments 






Chapter 5: Interracial Interactions 
Some features of diverse groups may interfere with decision-making. Interracial 
interactions are often fraught with discomfort, uncertainty, and anxiety (Blascovich, Mendes, 
Hunter, Lickel, & Kowai-Bell, 2001; Mendes, Blascovich, Lickel, & Hunter, 2002; Trawalter, 
Richeson & Shelton, 2009). A body of research establishes that interracial situations tend to 
invoke more stress than same race interactions, for both majority and minority group members 
(Trawalter, Richeston & Shelton, 2009). The tension associated with interracial interactions can 
also decrease cognitive capacity, possibly impairing jurors’ ability to engage with the trial 
information (Richeson & Shelton, 2005: Richeson, Trawalter & Shelton, 2005).  
Most of the research examining stress in interracial interactions focuses on the experience 
of majority group member and their concerns about appearing prejudiced as a primary 
mechanism to explain anxiety. Individuals with more negative racial attitudes tend to experience 
heightened anxiety at the prospect of interacting with a member of a stigmatized group 
(Blascovich et al., 2001; Mendes et al., 2002). The tensions can be even higher when issues of 
race are a topic of discussion during an interaction (Goff, Steele & Davies, 2008). Raising 
concerns about political correctness has been demonstrated to pre-occupy White individuals, 
increasing their tendency to engage in avoidance behaviors towards a minority partner (Norton, 
Sommers, Apfelbaum, Pura, & Ariely, 2006). 
Situations that require the suppression of stereotypes can cause decreased cognitive 
functioning (Baumeister, Muraven, & Tice, 2000; von Hippel, Silver, & Lynch, 2000). When 
people devote cognitive energy to inhibiting the expression of stereotypes, it impairs their 
performance on subsequent cognitively demanding tasks (Baumeister, Muraven, & Tice, 2000; 





that people engage in a self-regulatory process, which consumes cognitive resources. Moreover, 
the degree to which resources are depleted depends on how concerned individuals are with self-
regulation. Researchers in one study manipulated people’s prejudice concerns by providing false 
feedback on an IAT, and then having participant engage in an interracial interaction, followed by 
a Stroop task. Those who were told that they were more prejudiced on the IAT performed worse 
on the Stroop task than those who were told they were less prejudiced, following their interracial 
interactions (Richeson & Trawalter, 2005). Participants who believed they needed to suppress 
their stereotypical views of their partner during their interaction performed worse on the Stroop 
task after the interaction because they were using more executive resources to regulate their 
behavior. Another study tested White participants’ performance on the Stroop task after an 
interracial interaction. Participants’ racial attitudes (measured by their performance on an 
Implicit Association Task) were related to cognitive interference on the Stroop task after an 
interracial interaction but not after a same-race interaction (Richeson & Shelton, 2003). 
Cognitive decrements following interracial interactions have been document in both minority 
and White individuals (Richeson et al., 2005). Both White and the minority individuals 
experienced decreases in cognitive capacity following an interracial interaction, the extent of 
which was predicted by their negative implicit attitudes towards the other racial group (on the 
IAT task).  
Although many researchers have focused on the consequences of interracial interactions 
for White individuals there is a similar depletion of cognitive resources for minority individuals 
following an interracial interaction (Richeson et al., 2005). Minorities, however, may have 
additional drains on their cognitive resources in an interracial setting. Minority individuals’ 





Aronson, 1995). This phenomenon, known as stereotype threat, occurs because members of 
stigmatized groups recognize that there are stereotypes about their groups’ performance in 
specific areas. Therefore, these individuals experience psychological threat that interferes with 
performance in these areas, further confirming the stereotypes that exist.  
Rather than being concerned with suppressing stereotypes about others, minorities may 
be concerned that they will confirm stereotypes that others hold about them. Minorities engaging 
in interracial interactions often reporting feeling concerned about their potential to be a target of 
prejudice, regardless of the quality of their contributions to the interaction (Doerr, Plant, 
Kunstman, & Buck, 2011).  Minority concerns also include the worry that they will be seen as a 
stereotypical member of their group, which increases the pressure and anxiety that they feel in 
interracial situations (Shelton, Richeson, & Vorauer, 2006). In an interracial deliberation setting, 
minority individuals may be concerned about confirming stereotypes about their intelligence or 
cognitive abilities, which could consequently impair their ability to consider trial evidence.  
The consequences of resource depletion as they relate to interracial interactions are 
immense. When interacting with minority group individuals some Whites choose to sit further 
away from them (Goff et al., 2008).  Additionally, when Whites were asked to describe 
individuals in a photograph identification task, they tended to avoid using race as a characteristic 
when interacting with a Black partner. This resistance to use race as an identifying characteristic 
not only impeded performance on the task, but it also increased the likelihood that White 
participants would exhibit unfriendly behaviors towards their minority group partners (Norton et 
al., 2006). In a jury deliberation setting decreased cognitive capacity due to concerns about 
appearing prejudiced could lead to inaccurate evidence processing and lower quality decisions, 





documented decreased performance on cognitive tasks such as the Stroop task following 
interracial interactions, for both majority and minority group members (Richeson et al., 2005; 
Shelton & Richeson, 2003).  
Jury deliberations share features with the conditions under which anxiety about 
interracial interactions are most pronounced. Jury deliberations do not tend to have a specific 
script or structure, and judicial instructions about deliberations are intentionally vague, leaving 
jurors to their own devices to render accurate legal decisions. The unstructured nature of jury 
deliberations could prove problematic because unstructured interactions increase the amount of 
stress people experience compared to situations with a script providing instructions regarding the 
processes (Avery, Richeson, Hebl, & Ambady, 2009). In the current political climate, it is 
possible that a legal setting might raise concerns about racial issues. Raising concerns about 
possible racial prejudice has the potential to worsen tensions surrounding interracial interactions 
for White individuals (Goff et al., 2008; Norton et al., 2006). Research on interracial interactions 
suggests that diversity would not benefit the quality of deliberations but instead could possibly 







Chapter 6: Overview of the Proposed Research 
Minorities in general, and Black men in particular, are consistently overrepresented in 
both the U.S. prison and exoneration statistics. Biased jury decision-making plays a role in 
harsher outcomes for minority defendants (Mitchell et al., 2005). U.S. courts have repeatedly 
emphasized the importance of representative juries and the presence of minority jurors on juries, 
particularly in cases with minority defendants as a method for ameliorating racial bias in jury 
decisions (Peters v. Kiff, 1972; Ballew v. Georgia, 1978; Batson v. Kentucky, 1986). This 
emphasis led to the creation of a process by which the removal of jurors through peremptory 
challenges can be appealed through Batson challenges. Studies of Batson challenges, however, 
reveal that they are largely unsuccessful (Clark et al., 2007; Rose, 1999). The combination of 
unsuccessful Batson challenges and the tendency for prosecutors to remove minority jurors from 
the jury room suggests that minority defendants often have their cases decided by all-White, or 
majority White juries.  
What are the consequences of minority defendants being tried by all-White juries? The 
consequences appear unfairly severe for members of minority groups, particularly when it comes 
to sentencing decisions (Baldus, et al., 1983; Eberhardt et al., 2006; Hunt, 2015; Mitchell et al., 
2005). Statistics reveal that Black defendants receive longer sentences, and are sentenced to 
death more often than are White defendants (Mustard, 2001). Mock jury research also indicates 
that juries composed of mostly White jurors deciding death penalty cases are particularly prone 
to sentencing Black defendants with the death penalty (Lynch & Haney, 2011).  
Whether diversity in jury membership succeeds in reducing bias toward minority 
defendants in criminal trials has been under-examined. The limited studies on jury diversity 





towards minority defendants (Lynch & Haney, 2011; Sommers, 2006). The findings from jury 
decision-making research are confirmed by research on more basic group decision-making 
(Stasser et al., 1995; Phillips et al, 2004). However, there is a need for research examining 
explanatory mechanisms for the diversity benefit in deliberations. One study of jury diversity 
revealed that the higher quality of deliberations could be explained mostly by improvements in 
the contributions by White mock jurors in diverse juries (Sommers, 2006), possibly because of a 
“watchdog effect.”  Specifically, a watchdog effect occurs when majority group members 
concerned about prejudice pay closer attention to evidence when in the presence of minority 
group members, particularly when the defendant is a member of a minority group (Fleming et al., 
2005).  
This finding suggests possible mechanisms for improved jury performance in racially 
heterogeneous juries but leaves unanswered questions about the impact of minority jurors in 
diverse juries. Do minority individuals benefit from diversity in a jury group? Will minorities 
display higher quality and greater quantity of contributions to diverse groups than to 
homogenous groups? Or will the stress involved in engaging in interracial interactions erode the 
benefits of diversity?  
Alternately, some research suggests that the impact of diversity may not always be 
beneficial. Diverse groups tend to have more conflict and can be less cohesive than non-diverse 
groups (De Dreu & Weingart, 2003). Interracial interactions can be fraught with discomfort and 
cause anxiety, which is not conducive to higher quality performance on group tasks (Shelton & 
Richeson, 2003; Trawalter, et al., 2009). Situations that are open-ended without a cohesive script 
are also more likely to evoke anxiety and conflict in interracial interactions, both of which are 





interactions can also impair performance on cognitive tasks and inhibit interpersonal 
relationships (Norton et al., 2006; Shelton & Richeson, 2003).  
The goal of the current research was to investigate whether diverse juries engage in 
higher quality deliberations than do non-diverse juries. I predicted that diverse juries would 
engage in higher quality deliberations than would non-diverse juries. Most of the previous 
research investigates the effect of adding minority jurors to a homogenous jury but the current 
research also addressed the impact of diversity on minority jurors. I predicted that minority 
jurors would experience the same benefits from diversity that majority group members do. 
Another goal of this research was to examine the mechanisms underlying the improved jury 
deliberations in diverse juries. I also explored the effects of diversity when it is operationalized 
in a different manner than racial diversity.  
In the first study, I manipulated evidence strength and jury diversity, to determine 
whether diverse juries were more sensitive to evidence strength than non-diverse juries. To 
address questions of both individual levels of processing and quality of deliberations, analyses 
were conducted at both the jury and juror level both before and after deliberations to determine 
what impact the diversity of the group has on individual and group decisions. In the second 
study, I used a minimal groups paradigm (MGP) and assigned participants to high wealth/power 
and low wealth/power conditions. In the second study, I explored whether the impact of diversity 
on evidence processing and deliberations can extend to groups with membership based on 
something other than racial or ethnic group membership, and explore the role of wealth and 






Chapter 7: Overview of Study One 
The goal in Study One was to test the hypothesis that diverse juries will have higher 
quality deliberations than homogenous juries. Sommers (2006) found that racial diversity 
improved the deliberations of juries but that the benefit resulted mostly from higher quality 
contributions from White mock jurors. Sommers (2006) attributed this finding to the “watchdog 
effect,” namely that majority group members are motivated to process information from 
stigmatized groups (Fleming et al., 2005).  In this study, Sommers (2006) also manipulated the 
race salience of the trial, defined as how salient issues of race were during the trial (Sommers & 
Ellsworth, 2001).  Race salience and the watchdog effect operated similarly, and were derived 
from more modern theories of prejudice suggesting that when majority group members are aware 
of the potential to express prejudice, they work hard to avoid it (Dovidio & Gaertner, 1998). 
There is reason to believe the beneficial impact of diversity might not extend to minority 
jurors, at least according to the perspective that diversity improves deliberations through the 
increased vigilance of White jurors.  Thus far the watchdog effect is confined to White jurors 
evaluating minority targets and arguments from minority sources (Fleming et al., 2005; Petty et 
al., 1999; White & Harkins, 1994). The main tenet of the watchdog hypothesis is Whites’ 
motivation to avoid prejudice, and minorities are not usually concerned about appearing 
prejudiced. Minorities are more sensitive to the potential to be rejected by interaction partners 
based on their race, and therefore may be more focused on observing the behavior of their 
interaction partners (Mendoza-Denton, Downey, Purdie, Davis, & Pietrzak, 2002). Minorities 
may also experience decreased cognitive capacity when engaging in interracial interactions with 
Whites (Richeson et al., 2005). In the current study I wanted to examine the differential benefits 





This study compared diverse juries (e.g., mixed composition of White and minority 
jurors) to those composed of only White jurors and those composed of all-minority mock jurors. 
To test the hypothesis that diverse juries will result in greater sensitivity to case strength, I 
manipulated the strength of the evidence in the mock trial. Sensitivity to variations in evidence 
strength should reflect more careful, systematic processing of argument quality, according to the 
Elaboration Likelihood Model (Cacioppo et al., 1986). I predicted that both White and Black 
mock jurors would experience more systematic evidence processing in diverse juries. Moreover, 
I predicted that jurors in diverse juries would have greater sensitivity to case strength, as well as 






Chapter 8: Study 1 Methods 
Participants 
Four hundred thirty-three jury-eligible Black and White community members were 
recruited from Craigslist.org. Participants were paid $25 for participation, and if they were on 
time for the experimental session they were entered into a raffle to win an additional $25. 
Participants completed a screening questionnaire in the form of a Qualtrics survey to ensure that 
they were jury-eligible (i.e., 18 years of age or older and a U.S. citizen). Collecting participants’ 
demographic information in advance also allowed me to assign them to the appropriate 
conditions based on their racial group membership. Overall participants were about evenly split 
in terms of gender (51% men) and race (51% Black and 49% White). They averaged 39.59 years 
of age (SD = 14.83).  
Design, Materials, and Manipulations 
This study featured a 3 (Jury diversity: non-diverse White vs. non-diverse Black vs. 
diverse) x 2 (Strength of evidence: strong vs. weak) between subjects factorial design. 
Participants were randomly assigned to conditions for which they are eligible but could not be 
randomly assigned to all six conditions based on race (e.g., a White participant could not be 
assigned to a non-diverse Black jury condition).    
Voir dire.  Prior to viewing the trial video, participants completed a short voir dire 
questionnaire. Participants provided their gender, age, citizenship, marital status, level of 
education, occupation, voter registration, political views, ethnicity, and jury duty history.  
Trial stimulus. Mock jurors viewed a mock trial simulation ranging from 28-31 minutes 
(28 in the strong case, 31 in the weak case) in which the defendant was on trial for first-degree 





case featured in Hastie, Penrod and Pennington (1978). The fictional case in this book was 
originally derived from Commonwealth of Massachusetts v. Jones (1975).1 I developed a script 
based on a condensed version of the facts in the case, reducing the number of witnesses so that 
there were 3 witnesses for each side. The witnesses for the prosecution were: a detective, a 
medical examiner, and a witness (the bartender the night the crime took place). The witnesses for 
the defense were: the defendant, the defendant’s friend, and a witness (a waitress at the bar 
where the fight took place). 
The filming for the mock trial took place in a mock courtroom using volunteer actors, 
with both attorneys played by law students, and the judge played by a psychology faculty 
member. All versions of the trial video contained pattern judge’s instructions, opening and 
closing statements from the prosecuting and defense attorneys, and direct and cross-examination 
of the detective, medical examiner, bartender, waitress, defendant’s friend, and the defendant. 
The strength of evidence was manipulated by adding motive for the murder in the strong case, a 
more confident judgment from the medical examiner, and clearer views for the prosecutions’ 
eyewitness. All other case facts were held constant between the two evidence strength 
conditions.  
I conducted a pilot study to ensure the strong and weak evidence manipulation was 
successful. A total of 38 community members recruited from craigslist.org from the New York 
City area completed the study. All participants completed a demographic screening questionnaire 
prior to coming in for the study and I recruited Black and White participants for the pilot study to 
match the community member sample I would be using in Study 1. I extensively pilot tested to 
ensure that the appropriate percentage of guilty verdicts in the strong vs. weak case. The final 
                                                          





versions of the trial resulted in different conviction rates, 57% in the strong case, and 10% in the 
weak case. A Chi-square analysis revealed a significant difference in verdicts between the strong 
and weak conditions, χ2(1, N = 38) = 10.97, p <.01.  
Manipulations 
 Jury diversity. Diverse juries contained at least 2 mock jurors of each race. Non-diverse 
juries consisted of only Black (in the Black Non-diverse conditions) or only White (in the White 
Non-diverse conditions) mock jurors. 
Strength of evidence. The evidence strength manipulation is explained above in the trial 
stimulus section.  
Dependent Variables: Pre-Deliberation 
Dichotomous verdicts. Participants provided individual dichotomous verdicts (guilty or 
not guilty) after watching the trial videos but before the deliberations.  
Continuous verdict measures. Participants reported their confidence in their individual 
verdicts and the likelihood of the defendant’s guilt from 0-100%. Participants also rated: the 
strength of the prosecution’s case against the defendant (1= very weak, 7= very strong), the 
strength of the evidence indicating the defendant’s guilt (1= very weak, 7= very strong), and the 
strength of the evidence supporting the defendant’s innocence (1= very weak, 7= very strong). 
 Witness ratings. Participants rated all witnesses on 6 different dimensions on 7-point 
bipolar adjective pairs. These items included: trustworthy-untrustworthy, honest-dishonest, 
attractive-unattractive, not believable-believable (reverse-coded), convincing-unconvincing, 
certain-uncertain. The witnesses that participants rated were: detective, medical examiner, 
bartender, friend of the defendant, waitress, and the defendant with higher values corresponding 





 Anticipated social interaction. Participants provided their ratings of their expectations 
about the deliberations. To measure this, participants answered questionnaires with questions 
such as:  “I will feel comfortable during this interaction” on a 9-point scale (1= strongly disagree, 
9= strongly agree).  Other items were: self-conscious (reverse coded), not comfortable (reverse 
coded), be myself, feel accepted, feel comfortable sharing my views, feel comfortable 
disagreeing, not feel comfortable arguing (reverse coded).  
Dependent Variables: Post-Deliberation 
Jury verdicts. Each jury was instructed to come to a unanimous verdict and complete a 
form with a dichotomous (guilty/not guilty) option. If the jury did not reach a unanimous verdict 
after 45 minutes, the experimenter halted the deliberations and asked jurors to take a vote. These 
juries were considered hung juries.  
 Post-deliberation verdicts and measures. After deliberating with their jury groups, 
participants again provided individual responses to reflect their post-deliberation verdicts and 
recorded continuous verdict measures. These items were the same as the pre-deliberation 
dichotomous verdicts and continuous guilt measures. 
Social interaction ratings. Participants provided ratings of how comfortable they felt 
during the deliberations after the juries had finished deliberating. These items were the same as 
the pre-deliberations social interaction items, but they were phrased to reflect participants’ 
impressions of how comfortable they were during the interaction (i.e., “I felt comfortable 
disagreeing with other jurors”; 1= strongly disagree, 9= strongly agree).  
 Trust in the system. For the trust in the system variables I used items adapted from 
Lecci and Myers (2008) pre-trial juror questionnaire (PJAQ). Specifically, I used items that 





completed items such as “Out of every 100 people brought to trial, at least 75 are guilty of the 
crime with which they are charged” on a 7-point scale (1= strongly disagree, 7= strongly agree). 
Other items included: “If a suspect runs from police, then he probably committed the crime”, 
“generally the police make an arrest only when they are sure about who committed the crime”, 
“a prior record of conviction is the best indicator of a person’s guilt in the present case”, “when it 
is the suspect’s word against the police officer’s, I believe the police”, “if a witness refuses to 
take a lie detector test, it is because he/she is hiding something.” Higher scores corresponded 
with more trust in the system. 
Memory test. After viewing the trial and deliberating, participants completed a memory 
test on the trial and trial evidence. The memory test questions were in multiple choice form, and 
tested the participants’ memories for: the race of the defendant, the murder weapon, the name of 
the bar, the topic of the medical examiner’s testimony, and the main point of the defense’s case. 
Quality of deliberation measures. I videotaped deliberations, and research assistants 
transcribed every deliberation. To measure quality of deliberations, I combined coding schemes 
developed in previous research to measure deliberation quality (Sommers, 2006) and juror 
reasoning measures (Kuhn, Weinstock, & Flaton, 1994).  
First, with the help of several research assistants, I divided the deliberations into units, 
with units defined as one unique argument (Kuhn et al., 1994). Each unit consisted of an 
assertion, and any accompanying justification.  Research assistants and I then coded each unit. 
Most research assistants were blind to the hypotheses (although some knew that the study was 
about diversity), and every coder was blind to the condition of both the juries and the jurors 





coders were truly blind to diversity conditions. Several research assistants coded the data and I 
calculated inter-rater reliability scores using kappa.    
First, each unit was coded for quality. To be coded as sufficient, units had to meet 2 
criteria: first the evidence was either drawn from the case information or constituted a reasonable 
inference from the evidence in the case, and second the evidence either increased or decreased 
the probability that the criteria associated with a specific verdict were met. As such, sufficient 
units required both an opinion, and also some evidence or reasonable inference to support (or 
discount) that opinion.  
Sufficient units were then evaluated for unit type, indicating the purpose of the juror’s 
utterance. The four unit types were: justifying a chosen verdict, discounting an alternative 
verdict, discounting a chosen verdict, or supporting an alternative verdict. The chosen verdict 
was the opinion chosen by the juror during the initial vote process during deliberations. If jurors 
did not express their verdict in the beginning of deliberations, I used their pre-deliberation 
verdict choices as their chosen verdicts. The chosen verdict did not change throughout 
deliberations, so if jurors changed their vote, they would begin either to support the alternative 
verdict or to discount the chosen verdict. 
After characterizing the purpose of each unit, we then chose an argument type. For 
arguments that justified an opinion, they could be coded as 1 of 4 types: factual, narrative, 
importing, and credibility. Factual arguments referred to evidence drawn from the case 
information without elaboration to support an opinion. Narrative arguments used evidence to 
construct a narrative to support an opinion. Importing arguments used real world knowledge to 
support an opinion. Credibility arguments concluded that evidence was more accurate because of 





types: factual, inconsistent-importing, discounting-importing, and credibility. For discounting 
arguments, factual arguments involved referring to missing pieces of information to make the 
case inconsistent with the verdict (corresponding to “missing evidence” category from Sommers 
(2006)). Inconsistent-importing arguments used common sense to argue that evidence was 
inconsistent with the verdict. Discounting-importing arguments undermined specific pieces of 
evidence in order to discount the opinion. Discounting-credibility arguments concluded evidence 
to be less accurate because of the source of the information.  
The Sommers (2006) criteria that we used for our coding scheme were: number of units 
containing case facts, mentions of “missing evidence,” and the length of deliberations. The 
number of case facts and the mentions of missing evidence were derived from the coding units, 
with those coded as “Supporting-factual” and “Supporting-narrative” reserved for case facts, and 
those in the “Discounting-Factual” conditions were reserved for missing evidence. 
Procedure 
Potential participants responded to an advertisement on Craigslist, which provided a 
survey link for a Qualtrics survey. The survey featured demographic questions, and allowed 
researchers to identify eligible participants. Emails were sent to interested jury-eligible Black 
and White community members, offering them possible times to complete the study. Participants 
were recruited in groups of 9-15 participants, allowing for each session to contain either 1 or 2 
juries (allowing for the failure of some participants to show for their session).  Jury groups were 
made up of 4 to 7 jurors, and jurors were dismissed (if necessary) so that the jury groups were 
never larger than 7 or smaller than 4. The majority (73%) of juries contained 6 or more mock 





debriefed while the rest of the session began deliberations. Dismissal of jurors was done 
randomly (within the confines of maintaining at least 2 jurors of each race for diverse juries).  
 Participants then entered the mock courtroom in groups of 4-15, with diversity condition 
assigned by session to avoid suspicion on the part of participants. Participants completed consent 
forms, which included a request for permission to videotape them during the deliberation phase 
of the study. Participants were informed verbally that their videos would not be made public. 
Participants then filled out demographic questionnaires with questions similar to those asked 
during voir dire. The mock jurors then watched a trial video and completed their post-trial 
verdict questionnaires. After participants completed the questionnaires, they were instructed not 
to discuss the case with other participants and offered a short break. The researchers then divided 
juries into two different jury groups (if 10 or more participants were present). For each of the 
juries the experimenter reminded participants of the videotaping that would occur during the 
deliberations and instructed them that they should choose a foreperson in charge of fetching the 
researcher once the jury reached a unanimous verdict. Researchers then started the video 
recording and left the room, waiting outside for the duration of the deliberations. Participants 
were not informed of any timeline or deadline, although researchers stopped the deliberations if 
they continued for longer than 45 minutes and had participants count their votes. These juries 
were considered hung juries.  
After deliberations, the mock jurors completed the post-deliberation questionnaires. 
Participants were then paid, debriefed, and thanked for their participation. 
Data Analytic Plan 
 Pre-deliberation analyses. All analyses of dependent variables analyzed prior to 





analyze jurors’ pre-deliberation verdicts. I used Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) to evaluate 
jurors’ pre-deliberation continuous guilt measures, the ratings of witnesses, and anticipated 
social interaction. All pre-deliberation analyses were performed using SPSS Statistical Software. 
 Post-deliberation analyses. All analyses of post-deliberation individual dependent 
measures were no longer independent, violating assumptions of single-level tests. As a result, all 
post-deliberation individual measures were analyzed using multilevel techniques. The 
dichotomous juror verdicts were analyzed using a linear mixed effects design in R. The 
continuous measures were analyzed using nested ANOVAs in SPSS.  
 Jury level analyses. Because each jury is an independent data point, the analyses for 
juries did not require multilevel modeling. For jury verdicts we used binary logistic regression 
and examine classification tables to determine how well diversity of juries and race of the 
defendant predicted sensitivity to strength of evidence in mock juries. Main effects and 
interactions were observed. Significant interactions were followed-up with pairwise tests of the 







Chapter 9: Study 1 Results 
Descriptive Statistics 
 In total, 433 participants deliberated in 68 juries of 4 to 7 individuals. Of the original 433 
participants, 20 were removed prior to deliberations, leaving 413 participants. I also removed 4 
juries from analysis, as they did not meet the requirements for the diverse condition by having at 
least two jurors of each race. These 4 juries were comprised of 25 participants, so our final 
dataset contained 388 participants, who deliberated in 64 juries.  
Pre- Deliberation Analyses 
 Verdicts. Prior to deliberations, 26% of participants provided guilty verdicts. I used a 
standard binary logistic regression to determine whether there were pre-deliberation effects of 
case strength or diversity on jurors’ verdicts before deliberations.  In the first step I entered 3 
main effects: case strength and the two dummy-coded diversity conditions with diverse as the 
reference group. In the second step, I entered two interactions: case strength by each dummy-
coded diversity condition. In the first step with all the main effects entered, the omnibus test was 
significant, χ2(3, N = 393) = 39.52, p < .01, Nagelkerke R2 = .14. At the first step there was a 
significant main effect of case strength on pre-deliberation verdicts, Wald χ2(1, N = 393) = 
34.14, p = .00, Exp(B) = 4.71, 95% CI [2.80, 7.93].  The ratio of guilty verdicts to not guilty 
verdicts was 4.71 times higher in the strong case than it was in the weak case. In the strong case 
condition 39% of participants voted guilty, with only 12% of participants voting guilty in the 
weak case. In the second step adding interaction terms did not significantly improve the fit of the 






 Continuous guilt measures. I then ran ANOVAs examining the continuous measures for 
the pre-deliberation ratings of the guilt of the defendant. First, I calculated a verdict confidence 
measure by combining verdict and confidence in verdict. I multiplied not guilty verdicts by -1 to 
obtain a continuous scale from -100 (extremely confident in not guilty verdict) to +100 
(extremely confident in guilty verdict).  Consistent with results from the dichotomous judgments, 
a 3(Diversity) x 2(Case strength) ANOVA on the verdict confidence measure revealed a main 
effect for case strength, F (1, 385) = 40.43, p < .01, ηp
2 = .10. Participants in the strong case 
provided higher verdict confidence scores (M= -15.52) than did participants in the weak case 
(M= -61.74). No other main effects or interactions were significant, ps >.05. 
Witness ratings. After reverse coding the necessary items, I averaged the scales for all 
witness ratings so that higher scores corresponded with more positive ratings. I wanted to 
examine the effect of participant race on ratings of the witnesses, so I combined both of the non-
diverse conditions to turn diversity into a 2-level variable (diverse vs. non-diverse). I then ran a 2 
(Race of participant: Black vs. White) x 2 (Diversity: diverse vs. non-diverse) x 2 (Case strength: 
strong vs. weak) ANOVA examining the ratings of the detective (α = .83).  The ANOVA 
revealed a main effect for race of participant, F(1, 382) = 11.30, p < .01, ηp
2 = .03. White 
participants rated the detective (M = 4.77) more positively than did Black participants (M = 
4.32). No other main effects or interactions were significant (ps >.1).  
A 2 x 2 x 2 ANOVA examining the impact of race, diversity, and case strength on ratings 
of the defendant (α = .85) revealed a significant main effect for case strength, F (1, 379) = 61.93, 
p < .01, ηp
2 = .14. Participants in the weak case rated the defendant more positively (M = 4.90) 
than did participants in the strong case (M = 3.92). No other main effects or interactions were 





Anticipated social interaction. I averaged all 8 items on the anticipated social 
interaction scale (α = .85) and recoded all questions so that higher scores reflected feeling more 
positively about the forthcoming interaction. For the anticipated social interaction analyses, I 
wanted to examine race as an independent variable, so I ran a 2 (race) x 2 (diversity) x 2 (case 
strength) ANOVA. The ANOVA revealed no main effects of case strength or diversity condition 
on participants’ views about their upcoming interaction (ps >.05). However, there was a 
significant main effect for race such that Black participants anticipated feeling more comfortable 
during deliberations (M= 5.67) than did White participants (M= 5.42), regardless of diversity 
condition, F (1, 382) = 4.45, p < .05, ηp
2 = .01. 
Post-Deliberation Analyses 
Individual juror verdicts.  After deliberations, 9% of participants rendered guilty 
verdicts. After deliberating in a jury group participants’ individual verdicts were no longer 
independent. I used the glmer function in the package “lme4” in R Statistical software to perform 
a multilevel logistic regression examining jurors’ post-deliberation verdicts. First, I conducted an 
analysis on the null model to determine how much variance was due to group membership. With 
the null model I added Jury as the random intercept for the model, and found an intra-class 
correlation (ICC) of .52, demonstrating that 52% of the variance in the model could be explained 
by group membership. The mean reliability within jury groups was 87%.  
I then ran the linear mixed model with Jury as a random intercept. I entered strength of 
case as a fixed effect and also the two dummy-coded diversity variables with the diverse 
condition as the reference group. I also included the interactions between case strength and each 
of the dummy coded diversity variables. None of the main effects or interactions of the main 





Continuous guilt measures. I ran a nested ANOVA to examine the effects of case 
strength and diversity on the continuous guilt measures. For this analysis, I included the jury 
group as a random clustering effect and case strength and diversity as fixed effects.  
First, I examined the verdict confidence measure. I calculated this in the same manner as 
with the pre-deliberation guilt ratings by using confidence in verdict ratings and multiplying 
these values by -1 for not guilty verdicts. This resulted in a scale from -100 (highly confident in a 
not guilty verdict) to +100 (highly confident in a guilty verdict). Then, I ran a 3(Diversity) x 
2(Case strength) nested ANOVA to account for the nesting of participants in juries. The results 
of this analysis revealed a fixed main effect of case strength, F(1, 60.34) = 4.49,  p  < .05, ηp
2 = 
.07.  Participants in the strong case condition were less confident in their not guilty verdicts (M= 
-61.40) than were participants in the weak case condition (M = -84.07). No other main effects or 
interactions were significant, ps > .05.  
Social Interaction Ratings 
To calculate ratings of the quality of the social interaction that occurred during the 
deliberations, I averaged all post deliberation interaction ratings and recoded several items so 
that higher numbers corresponded with more positive social interactions (α = .85). Prior to 
deliberations, I observed a main effect of race such that White participants reported expecting to 
feel less comfortable than Black participants. To determine whether these ratings were impacted 
by deliberations, I conducted a 2 (Diversity) x 2 (Race of participant x 2 (Case strength) nested 
ANOVA, with errors nested within jury groups.  Ratings of the quality of the social interactions 
following deliberations revealed no significant main effects or interactions, ps >.05.  





 I averaged all the items on the trust in the system scale (α = .78) and performed a nested 
ANOVA on the scale. I anticipated racial differences on the scale so I conducted a 2 (Race) x 2 
(Diversity) x 2 (Case strength) nested ANOVA. The analysis revealed a significant two-way 
interaction between case strength and race of participants, F(1, 108.91)= 7.57, p < .01, ηp
2 = .07. 
In the weak case, there were no racial differences in ratings of trust in the system (Ms= 2.79 vs. 
2.97), d = -.12, p = .51, 95% CI[-.48, .24]. However, in the strong case, White participants rated 
their trust in the system as higher (M= 3.04) than did Black participants (M=2.60), d = .57, p < 
.01, 95% CI[.23, .92].  
Quality of Deliberations Measures 
 Deliberations coding. The coding of deliberations revealed that there were 6,320 units 
(made up of an argument and any accompanying justification) in the 64 jury deliberations. The 
mean number of units per juror was 16.33 (SD = 17.41).  Each unit was coded for purpose and 
quality. We had an overall 90% agreement rate between coders, and disagreements were 
resolved through discussion. Descriptive statistics for the coding criteria for individual jurors are 
presented in Table 2. Only analyses with significant diversity effects are presented fully in text. 
 First, I examined the number of units per juror. We conducted a 2 (race) x 2 (diversity) x 
2 (case strength) nested ANOVA with jury group as the random clustering effect to determine 
any main effects or interactions on the number of units per juror. The results of the nested 
ANOVA revealed a significant main effect of case strength, F(1, 82.33) = 5.87, p = .02, ηp
2 = 
.07. Participants in the strong case provided more units (M = 20.85) than did participants in the 
weak case (M = 13.55).  No other main effects or interactions were significant (ps >.05).  
 The first category used in the coding process was quality. To be sufficient, units had to be 





used the number of sufficient units per juror as my outcome measure, and conducted a 2 x 2 x 2 
nested ANOVA to account for the error due to jury groups. There were no main effects for 
diversity or race but there was a main effect for case strength, F(1, 87.64) = 6.48, p = .02, ηp
2 = 
.07. Participants who viewed the strong case provided more sufficient units (M= 7.82) than did 
participants in the weak case (M =5.31). The main effect was qualified by a significant diversity 
by strength of case interaction, F(1, 87.19) = 5.23, p =.02, ηp
2 = .06.  Follow-up tests revealed 
that in the weak case conditions there was no significant effect of case strength (Ms= 5.47 vs. 
4.68), d = -.59, p = .53, 95% CI [-2.45, 1.25]. However, for participants who viewed the strong 
case, those who deliberated in diverse juries delivered more sufficient units (M = 10.00) than did 
participants who deliberated in non-diverse juries (M= 6.05), d = 3.86, p < .01, 95% CI [2.08, 
5.64]. 
 Units were then evaluated for the type of argument they represented. The four categories 
were: supporting the chosen, discounting the alternative, discounting the chosen, and supporting 
the alternative. I only reported categories that revealed significant diversity effects in a nested 
ANOVA. The number of discounting alternative arguments, displayed both a significant main 
effect of case strength (F(1, 92.59) = 5.90, p = .02, ηp
2 = .06) and a significant interaction 
between diversity and case strength, F(1, 92.68) = 4.53, p = .04, ηp
2 = .05. Follow- up tests 
revealed no difference between jurors deliberating diverse compared to non-diverse juries (Ms 
1.69 vs. 2.08), d= -.31, p =.48, 95% CI [-1.17, .55] in the weak case, but for the strong case 
jurors who deliberated in diverse juries provided significantly more discounting arguments (M= 






 Supporting arguments (either for the chosen opinion or for an alternative opinion), were 
coded as: factual, narrative, importing, or credibility. Discounting arguments (for either the 
alternative or chosen opinion) were coded as: factual, importing-inconsistent, importing-
discounting, and credibility. The supporting-facts category was combined with the supporting-
narrative category and represented the number of units in which case facts were mentioned. In 
the supporting-facts category, participants stated facts, and in the supporting-narrative category, 
participants provided facts and elaborated on those facts to create a story. The discounting-facts 
category was reserved to represent number of times jurors asked for “missing evidence.” I then 
combined the remaining variables that reflected similar types of thinking. I combined 
supporting-importing and supporting-credibility into a “Supporting Reasoning” category. I left 
“Discounting-inconsistent” as its own category; representing jurors’ ability to take real world 
knowledge to judge evidence as less consistent with verdict criteria.  The last category I created 
was a “Discounting-Evidence” which combined discounting importing and discounting 
credibility, both of which discounted evidence because of its unreliability. Only categories with 
significant diversity effects are presented. 
For the “Discounting-Evidence” category, there was a significant interaction between 
diversity and case strength on the number of discounting arguments used to dispute the 
credibility of the evidence presented, F(1, 93.57) = 5.09, p = .03, ηp
2 = .05. Follow-up tests 
revealed that in the weak case there was no significant effect of diversity on disputing credibility 
(Ms= .71 vs. .97; d = -.17, p =.49, 95% CI [-.65, .31]), but for those who viewed the strong case, 
jurors in diverse juries provided more discounting credibility arguments (M= 1.70) than jurors 





I examined the 2 x 2 x 2 ANOVA on the number of units mentioning case facts, which is 
similar to the Sommers (2006) coding criteria of number of case facts mentioned. There was a 
significant diversity by case strength interaction, F(1, 88.12)= 4.21,  p = .04, , ηp
2 = .05. Pairwise 
comparisons revealed that in the weak case, there was no effect for diversity (Ms= 1.15 vs. 1.71), 
d = -.45, p = .20, 95% CI [-1.13, .24].  In the strong case, however, jurors deliberating in diverse 
juries provided more units containing case facts (M= 2.86) than did jurors deliberating in non-
diverse juries (M= 1.71), d = 1.11, p < .01, 95% CI [.46, 1.77].  
The other Sommers (2006) criteria I coded for was jurors’ mentions of “missing” 
evidence or requests for more evidence in the case. There were no significant main effects or 
interactions of case strength, diversity, or race of participant on participants’ ratings of pieces of 
requested evidence, ps > .05.  
Jury Level Analyses 
Verdicts. Out of the total 64 juries, 56 (88%) voted to acquit the defendant, whereas only 
5 juries (8%) voted to convict. Three juries (5%) remained hung after the 45 minutes allotted for 
deliberation. We counted majority votes for each hung jury, and after that 5 (8%) voted to 
convict the defendant, whereas 59 (92%) voted to acquit the defendant.  
I performed a binary logistic regression on the jury verdicts once the vote counts had 
been calculated. In the first step I added the strength of case predictor, as well as the two 
dummy-coded diversity conditions. In the second step I added the interactions between case 
strength and each of the dummy-coded diversity conditions. None of the main effects or 
interactions were significant at the jury-level. 
Length of deliberations.  I also coded for the length of deliberations, consistent with the 





the length of deliberations. Main effects and interactions on deliberation length were not 








Chapter 10: Study 1 Discussion 
 The main hypothesis in Study 1 was that racially diverse juries would have higher quality 
deliberations than either type of non-diverse jury, consistent with the findings of Sommers 
(2006). My first hypothesis was that jurors deliberating in diverse juries would be more sensitive 
to variations in evidence strength than would jurors deliberating in non-diverse juries. I did not 
find that jurors were more sensitive to case strength when deliberating in diverse juries, meaning 
this hypothesis was not supported.  
There are several potential explanations for the lack of sensitivity effects. First, the post-
deliberation conviction rate was very low, and this may have created a floor effect, with 
insufficient variation to detect differences between groups. Another possible explanation for the 
lack of sensitivity is that diversity does not influence verdicts. This is consistent with findings 
from previous research finding that diversity influenced the quality of jurors’ contribution to 
discussion, but not their verdicts (Sommers, 2006). This is not consistent, however, with other 
research finding that mock jurors deliberating in diverse juries deliver less racially biased 
verdicts and sentences than juries mainly composed of White men (Lynch & Haney, 2011). A 
third possibility for explaining the lack of sensitivity effects is that they may have been 
overridden by the shift towards acquittal following deliberations. Prior to deliberations, 
participants were more likely to convict in the strong case than in the weak case. Although this 
finding indicates that my manipulation of evidence strength was successful, it is notable that the 
effect disappeared following deliberations. There was a major shift towards acquittal following 
deliberations, which is possibly indicative of the leniency effect. Prior research has noted that 
jurors tend to deliver more lenient judgments after deliberating in a jury (Kerr & MacCoun, 





influenced by the majority vote of the jury group. With an overall low conviction rate, this 
majority would likely shift most juries towards acquittal. Whether a leniency effect or a result of 
majority influence, either could have overwhelmed my ability to detect diversity effects. 
My second main hypothesis was that jurors deliberating in diverse juries would make 
higher quality contributions to discussion, consistent with the Sommers (2006) findings. This 
hypothesis was partially supported, in that while diversity did not improve the quality of 
deliberations overall, diversity did improve the quality of deliberations in the strong case. For 
those who viewed the strong case jurors deliberating in diverse juries made more high quality 
contributions to discussion than did jurors deliberating in non-diverse juries. When viewing the 
strong case jurors deliberating in diverse juries provided more sufficient units, more 
counterarguments, more arguments used to discount the reliability of evidence, and more units 
containing case facts when deliberating in diverse juries than they did when deliberating in non-
diverse juries. This finding is consistent with previous research finding that diverse juries have 
higher quality discussion content than non-diverse juries (Sommers, 2006). These effects were 
likely restricted to the strong case because the strong case was more ambiguous in terms of guilt, 
and because we can detect differences more easily when stimuli are ambiguous. 
Also not all my quality of deliberations measures revealed significant effects for diversity 
in the strong case. Contrary to the Sommers (2006) criteria, there were no significant effects for 
the mentions of missing evidence, and at the jury level there were no significant effects on the 
length of deliberations. This could be due to the lower sample size of juries compared to jurors, 
making it more difficult to detect differences. Also, the fact that diversity effects were only 
found for the strong case, means my sample was further restricted because of how easily juries 





Participant race did not affect the quality of deliberation contributions, suggesting that 
diversity similarly affected participants of both races. This finding is somewhat different than 
that of Sommers (2006) and also suggests that diversity’s impact goes beyond the watchdog 
effect (Fleming et al., 2005). Minorities benefitting from diversity does not rule out the 
possibility of the watchdog effect, but it does suggest that diversity might operate through other 
mechanisms as well. The results from the current study suggest that diversity might improve 
deliberations because of the heterogeneity of experiences and perspectives (Nemeth, 1986), 
rather than from a reduction of prejudice. It is also possible that diversity’s benefits operate 
differently for minority and majority group members. We cannot determine which explanation is 
correct from the current research, but this is an exciting avenue for future study. 
 Black participants reported anticipating they would feel more comfortable during the 
interaction than White participants did. Although interracial interactions have the potential to 
make Whites concerned about appearing prejudiced (Mendes et al., 2002; Norton et al., 2006), 
Whites were equally concerned about deliberating with White and Black jurors, as evidenced by 
the effect of race but not diversity on ratings of anticipated social interaction. Maybe a trial 
stimulus featuring a Black defendant was enough to make White participants anxious about the 
upcoming interaction, regardless of the race of the other mock jurors. The premise of the 
watchdog effect is that low-prejudiced White individuals increase their vigilance in order to 
protect minorities from prejudice (Fleming et al., 2005), so the anxiety about the upcoming 
interaction may be attributable to this concern. White individuals tend to experience anxiety 
when political correctness concerns are heightened (Norton et al., 2006), and it is possible that 





in the courtroom, however, suggests that jurors’ awareness of the race of a Black defendant is not 
a sufficient condition for making racial issues salient (Sommers & Ellsworth, 2000; 2001; 2009).  
 White participants rated the detective more positively than did Black participants. 
Because the detective was a White woman, negative ratings for Black participants might indicate 
outgroup bias towards an outgroup member (Mitchell et al., 2005), but since no such difference 
was found in ratings of the defendant, this seems unlikely. The more negative ratings of the 
police officer by Black participants were more likely indicative of a lack of trust in police. 
Previous research suggests that minorities have less favorable views of the police than do White 
individuals (Weitzer & Tuch, 1999; 2004; 2005). Similarly, I found that in the strong case Black 
participants expressed higher trust in the system than White participants did. Both lower ratings 
of the police officer and lower trust in the system ratings are consistent with research finding that 
minority individuals experience more injustice and unfair outcomes at the hands of the justice 
system (Barnes & Kingsnorth, 1996; Mustard, 2001) and often have more negative views of 
institutions such as the courts and the police (Overby, et al., 2005;Weitzer & Tuch, 2005). 
Minorities also exhibit lower trust in a number of institutions, including the courts, jury system, 
and political institutions (Overby, Brown, Bruce, Smith, & Winkle, 2005; Rose, Ellison & 
Diamond, 2008). 
 Participants rated the defendant more positively when deciding the weak case rather than 
the strong case, but no other significant effects were observed on the ratings of the defendant. 
The defendant was Black in all conditions, meaning I did not find evidence of more bias when 
the defendant was an outgroup member compared to when he was an ingroup member. This is 
contrary to most of the work on mock juror judgments, in particular the most recent meta-





this outgroup bias effect (Mazzella & Feingold, 1994). Even the main racial bias meta-analysis 
supporting an outgroup bias effect finds that the effect is larger for minorities making judgments 
about White defendants, a condition not present in the current study (Mitchell et al., 2005). 
Additionally, some mock juror studies have found little evidence of bias towards outgroup 
defendants (Foley & Pigott, 2002), or conditions under which bias can be eliminated (Sommers 
& Ellsworth, 2000; 2001). 
Limitations  
 The largest limitation to the present study was the low conviction rate, particularly in the 
post deliberations individual verdicts. These low rates may represent floor effects, which likely 
explain why it was difficult to detect results from the dichotomous post deliberation verdicts and 
continuous guilt measures. The pre-deliberation conviction rates were relatively low, and 
following deliberations the guilt rate was even lower due to the leniency effect of deliberations 
(Kerr & MacCoun, 2012). Relatedly, the fact that post-deliberation guilt rates were so uniformly 
low meant there was less ambiguity and discussion necessary for jurors to come to a unanimous 
decision during deliberation in the weak case condition. The weak case was so unambiguous that 
it did not provide enough opportunity for jurors to engage in productive discussion, as juries 
often entered the deliberations unanimous, or with a clear majority of not guilty verdicts. As a 
result of uniform acquittals upon the beginning of deliberations, I found that the case strength 
actually influenced the quality of deliberation content. Participants in the strong case condition 
made higher quality contributions to discussion, than did participants in the weak case. Future 
studies should insure that they have sufficient ambiguity in their trial stimulus to correct for this, 
and should possibly pilot test their stimuli after deliberations to determine whether they have 





 The other limitations to the present study concern the nature of the study and its 
conditions. I stopped deliberations after 45 minutes, and this may have contributed to the lack of 
diversity’s impact on the length of deliberations. Sommers (2006) did find an effect for diversity 
on the length of deliberations, and the researchers in that study allowed deliberations to occur for 
60 minutes instead. 
Conclusions 
The first study did not support my initial hypothesis that diverse juries would distinguish 
between strong and weak evidence more effectively than non-diverse juries.  However, the 
quality of deliberations measures did provide some support for diversity’s benefit, with jurors in 
diverse juries providing more units with case facts and more sufficient arguments than jurors in 
non-diverse juries. Additionally, jurors in diverse juries were more likely to deliver 
counterarguments and discount evidence lacking in reliability than jurors in non-diverse juries. 
The finding of higher quality contributions from jurors deliberating in diverse juries is consistent 
with previous research examining jury deliberation content (Sommers, 2006).  
We did not find any race effects on contributions to deliberations, and this builds upon 
the finding from Sommers (2006) that White jurors made higher quality contributions to 
deliberations. The significant benefits of diversity, combined with the lack of effects of 
participant race, suggest that diversity benefits both majority and minority group members. I did, 
however, find racial differences on the participants’ ratings of the detective in the case, and in 
their trust in the system. These findings may be related, and reveal some racial differences in 
how individuals view justice system. Overall, the results of this study support previous research 
in finding that diverse juries will have higher quality discussions than non-diverse juries 





in the presence of minority members (Sommers, Warp & Mahoney, 2008). Additionally, this 
research suggests that future research should explore whether trust in the legal system might play 
a role in how the inclusion of racial minorities on juries might improve deliberations. 





Chapter 11: Study 2 Introduction 
In the second study, I sought to define diversity in a different manner than in the first 
study. I used a minimal groups paradigm (MGP) to investigate the impact of wealth and power 
differentials and their potential impact on deliberations in heterogeneous juries. Although there is 
no work directly examining the impact of power and its relationship with jury performance, 
previous studies on organizational and group dynamics have documented that unequal 
distribution of power and resources can impact group performance, causing minorities to 
experience identity threat (Alderfer & Smith, 1982; Foldy, Rivard, & Buckley, 2009; Steele, 
Spencer, & Aronson, 2002). Stereotype content research also establishes that Whites are 
perceived as high in competence based on their position as a high status group (Fiske, Cuddy, 
Glick, & Xu, 2002).  These power differentials between members of different racial and ethnic 
groups have the potential to enter the jury room and interfere with jury performance. Moreover, 
separating the specific stereotypes surrounding racial groups in their relation to crime can help us 
understand how differences in wealth and power can impact jury deliberations, even when both 
are irrelevant to the task at hand. 
Research on jury deliberations suggests that power differentials play a significant role in 
the proceedings of jury deliberations. Traditionally, jury research has found that members of 
higher social status groups (i.e., higher incomes and education levels) tend to participate more in 
the jury deliberations than jurors of lower social status groups (Hastie et al., 1983; York & 
Cornwell, 2006). Similarly, women tend to contribute less to jury deliberations than men (Hastie 
et al., 1983). More recent surveys have found some conflicting results about race and gender.  
Racial differences emerged about self-reported participation in jury deliberations, but in a 





participation followed by White and Hispanic jurors. Socioeconomic status (SES), however, 
continues to be influential in more recent examinations of self-reported participation in jury 
deliberations, with high SES individuals reporting more participation in juries and being 
perceived as more influential than low SES individuals (Cornwell & Hans, 2011; York & 
Cornwell, 2006). 
Work examining intergroup power also finds that high power individuals tend to act 
differently in groups than do low power individuals (for a review, see Brauer & Bourhis, 2006). 
One study found that high power groups tended to express their opinions more often, and were 
less susceptible to feeling the pressure of an intergroup situation (Galinsky, Magee, Gruenfeld, & 
Whitson, 2008). Social dominance orientation (SDO) can also be relevant to understanding the 
impact of power dynamics in jury deliberations (Ho et al., 2015; Sidanius & Pratto, 1999). SDO 
refers to the tendency for high status individuals to believe that they deserve their position at the 
top of the power hierarchy, and to maintain their position. People high in SDO are more likely to 
engage in prejudice and discriminatory behavior toward outgroups (Amiot & Bourhis, 2005). 
Jurors high in SDO tend to punish outgroup members more than do jurors low in SDO, who are 
far more likely to be egalitarian, and therefore not discriminatory (Kemmelmeier, 2005).  
Racial diversity and diversity of perceived wealth and power are often confounded in jury 
studies that focus on racial diversity. This occurs because White individuals tend to be perceived 
as a high status group (Fiske, Cuddy, Glick, & Xu, 2002), and therefore their position in the jury 
deliberation tends to be that of higher power. In terms of legal decisions, however, different 
racial groups tend to have specific relationships with the legal system in terms of both their 
perceptions of the system (Overby et al., 2005; Weitzer & Tuch, 2005), and in others’ 





2002; Espinoza & Willis-Esqeuda, 2008; Payne, 2001). Moreover, there are problems associated 
with grouping all ethnic minorities into one non-White category, when each ethnic minority 
group has its own unique set of values and attitudes (van Knippenberg & Schippers, 2007). The 
benefit of using a MGP is that it can test the impact of diversity while eliminating some crime-
specific stereotypes surrounding racial/ethnic groups, and can eliminate issues that arise from 
grouping members of different minority groups together.  
Early work on intergroup discrimination had previously demonstrated that ingroup 
favoritism and hostility towards outgroups could be created when there were two groups in 
competition with each other (Sherif, 1966).  These associations form because people derive high 
levels of self-esteem from identifying with and belonging to their ingroup, and develop 
antagonistic feelings towards competing groups. Although this early work revealed intergroup 
hostility in competitive settings (Sherif, 1966), the minimal groups paradigm (MGP) emphasized 
that directly competing for resources was not a necessary requirement for discrimination between 
groups. Despite the use of trivial criteria (e.g., similar preferences for one painting over another) 
to create groups, researchers repeatedly found that people had a significant preference for their 
ingroup (Billig & Tajfel, 1973; Tajfel & Billig, 1974). Typically, participants reflected this 
preference in the decisions they made when allocating their resources, showing ingroup 
favoritism and outgroup discrimination (Tajfel et al., 1971). This paradigm was instrumental in 
developing social identity theory, which demonstrated people’s natural tendency to make 
distinctions between ingroup and outgroup members (Tajfel & Turner, 1979).  
The MGP was initially created to demonstrate that people could develop strong feelings 
of association with ingroup members and hostility toward outgroup members, even when the 





research has established methods of manipulating wealth and power within a MGP, using 
monopoly money to signify wealth and a greater stake in the allocation decisions to simulate 
power (Harvey & Bourhis, 2012). In this study, wealth was manipulated through the differential 
distribution of monopoly money to participants depending upon their assignment to a wealth 
condition. The researchers manipulated power by allowing some groups to have more control 
over how resources were allocated than others. In the end, the wealthy and powerful group has 
more money and more power to distribute that money. Previous MGP studies manipulating 
wealth and power have demonstrated that independent of wealth and power manipulations, 
people tend to show favoritism and discrimination based on their group membership (Harvey & 
Bourhis, 2012). 
The current study used the procedure in Harvey and Bourhis (2012) to manipulate power 
and wealth to create two different groups: a high wealth/power group and a low wealth/power 
group. I manipulated diversity by combining the wealth/power groups in the diverse conditions. I 
predicted that diverse juries (i.e., juries combining both wealth/power groups) will exhibit more 







Chapter 12: Study 2 Overview 
Study 2 explores the same theoretical principles as Study 1, but addresses them through a 
more basic ingroup/outgroup paradigm. Study 1 elucidates the effects of racial diversity on how 
juries and individuals process trial evidence, but does not approach some of the fundamental 
reasons for racial differences in perceptions of legal issues. Minorities tend to have less trust in 
the legal system and in actors in the legal system, than majority group members do (Overby et 
al., 2005; Weitzer & Tuch, 2005). Additionally, people tend to have associations between 
minorities and different types of crime (Correll, Park, Judd, & Wittenbrink, 2002; Espinoza & 
Willis-Esqeuda, 2008; Payne, 2001). Yet, much of the research on jury deliberations focuses on 
the social status and power of individual jurors (York & Cornwell, 2006). The purpose of this 
research is to study diversity when it is separated from the crime-specific stereotypes associated 
with racial and ethnic groups, and instead captures the wealth and power differential between 
Whites and other minority groups. This study will use a minimal groups paradigm (MGP) to 
manipulate participants’ wealth and power to simulate power dynamics that may operate in 
diverse juries. Using a manipulation of wealth and power in the context of a MGP that has been 
successful in creating discriminatory patterns of behavior in past research (Harvey & Bourhis, 
2012), participants will participate in a trial simulation and deliberate in either diverse (mixed 
wealth/power groups) or homogenous (separate wealth/power groups) juries.  
 I predicted that diverse juries (as defined by a combination of high and low wealth/power 
participants) would exhibit more sensitivity to case strength than would non-diverse juries, 
irrespective of whether the members all had high or low wealth/power juries. I also predicted that 





than would low wealth/power individuals, and that diverse juries would exhibit higher levels of 






Chapter 13: Study 2 Methods 
Participants 
Three-hundred-sixty-nine jury-eligible undergraduate psychology students at an urban 
public university in the northeast completed the study for course credit. Participants were pre-
screened for jury-eligible status (over 18 years old and a U.S citizen). Participants were 75.6% 
female and averaged 20.75 years old (SD = 4.29). The sample was ethnically diverse (42.8% 
Hispanic, 16.8% Black, 16.0% White, 9.8% Other).  
Design and Materials 
Participants were randomly assigned to a 3 (jury diversity: diverse vs. non-diverse high 
wealth/power vs. non-diverse low wealth/power) x 2 (evidence strength: strong vs. weak) 
between subjects factorial design. 
Voir dire. Prior to viewing the trial video, participants completed a short voir dire 
questionnaire. Participants provided their gender, age, citizenship, marital status, level of 
education, occupation, voter registration, political views, ethnicity, and jury duty history.  
Trial stimulus. I used the same trial in the second study as I did in the first. However, the 
defendant was Hispanic instead of Black in the second study.  
Manipulations 
 Wealth/Power. Wealth and power were confounded in the present study so that I had a 
high wealth/power condition and a low wealth/power condition. In the high wealth/power 
condition, I told participants they would receive $1,000 in monopoly money and their decisions 
would account for 70% of the overall allocation of the total sum of monopoly money in the 
study. In the low wealth/power condition participants received $300 in monopoly money and 





money. Participants were told that the totals for the study would be calculated at the end of the 
study. I informed participants that this was the only purpose for their allocation decisions about 
the monopoly money.  
 Jury Diversity. Diverse juries contained at least two members of the high-wealth/power 
group and the low-wealth/power groups. Non-diverse juries consisted of either all low-
wealth/power group members or all high-wealth/power group members. 
 Evidence Strength. The evidence strength manipulation was identical to the 
manipulation in Study 1.  
Procedure 
Participants were recruited through the Sona online recruitment system, and entered the 
study in groups of 4-16. The procedure for the first part of the study was based on the minimal 
groups paradigm manipulation developed by Harvey and Bourhis (2012). When participants 
arrived, they were assigned to either the high-wealth/power group or the low wealth/power 
group. Participants were in either “Group A” or “Group B,” assigned by odd or even participant 
numbers to emphasize the randomness of the group assignments. I used randomization to 
determine whether Group A or Group B was high power. Based on the method of simulating 
wealth by Vohs, Mean & Goode (2006), I used monopoly money to signify wealth. I awarded 
$1,000 to each member of the high wealth/power group and $300 to each member of the low 
wealth/power group, consistent with earlier research (Harvey & Bourhis, 2012). After 
distributing the Monopoly money, the experimenter informed participants that the high power 
group’s decisions about how to distribute the money would count for 70% of the final 
distribution of the monopoly money, with the low power group’s decisions counting only 30% in 





 Once the groups were assigned the experimenter explained the distribution task and 
handed out questionnaires for all participants to fill out before completing the task. Participants 
first completed three Tajfel matrices originally developed for use in minimal groups paradigms 
(Tajfel, et. al, 1971). The matrices were labeled “Ingroup” for ingroup member on the top row of 
the matrices, and “Outgroup” for outgroup members on the bottom row of the matrices. For each 
matrix, one side of the scale represented rewarding ingroup members and punishing outgroup 
members, whereas the other side of the scale represented rewarding outgroup members and 
punishing ingroup members. The middle of the scale allowed for more equal distribution of 
funds among ingroup and outgroup members. Participants received 3 envelopes, one labelled 
“Group A Member,” one labelled “Group B Member,” and one labelled “Future Studies.” 
Consistent with the procedure in Harvey & Bourhis (2012) I asked participants to report how 
much of the money from the whole experiment they would like to give back to the researchers to 
contribute to future studies. The purpose of asking participants to donate to future studies was to 
emphasize that resources were finite, since the participants in the low wealth/power groups did 
not have much money to donate. Participants placed the appropriate amount of money in each 
envelope (as dictated by their decisions on the matrices and their donation to future studies).  
Following this first task, participants filled out additional questionnaires with questions about 
their group membership and their feelings of wealth and power.  
 After completing the resource allocation tasks, the participants completed the study in the 
same manner as in Study 1. Participants completed the voir dire questionnaire, watched the trial 
video, completed post-trial questionnaires, and then were divided into deliberation groups of 4-7 





arrive at a unanimous decision and then retrieve a researcher at the conclusion of the study. 
Participants then completed post-deliberation questionnaires and were debriefed.   
Dependent Variables 
 This study used all dependent variables from Study 1, with additional dependent 
variables for the MGP portion of the study.  
 Reports of wealth/power. Following the allocation task, participants rated, on a scale of 
1-7, how wealthy they felt and how powerful they felt. These questions acted as manipulation 
checks for the power and wealth manipulations. 
 Social identity questions. Four items were combined for a composite score representing 
how happy and satisfied participants felt in their group on a 7-point Likert scale. The questions 
asked were how much they liked being members of their own group, how happy, at ease, 
satisfied and vulnerable (reverse scored) they felt as members of their group (Harvey & Bourhis, 
2012).  
Data Analysis 
 Data from the mock trial portion of the study will be analyzed in the same manner as the 
previous two studies. The manipulation checks will be analyzed using one-way ANOVAs to test 







Chapter 14: Study 2 Results 
Descriptive Statistics 
 Overall, 369 participants deliberated in 60 juries of 4 to 7 individuals. Of the 369 
participants, 13 were removed prior to deliberations, leaving 356 participants following 
deliberations.  
Manipulation Checks 
 Participants’ responses to the manipulation check questions reflected the fact that my 
wealth/power manipulation had the intended effect. I conducted a one-way ANOVA on 
participants’ ratings of how wealthy and powerful they felt. Participants in the high wealth/power 
condition reported feeling wealthier (M= 4.60) than did those in the low wealth/power condition 
(M= 3.21), F(1, 364)= 64.34, p < .00.  Participants in the high wealth/power condition also 
reported feeling more powerful (M=4.52) than did those in the low wealth/power condition (M= 
3.34), F(1, 364)= 51.02, p < .00. I also combined all items on the satisfaction with group 
membership scale (α = .78) based on the procedure in Harvey & Bourhis (2012). Participants in 
the high wealth/power conditions expressed more satisfaction as members of their group (M= 
4.89) than did participants in the low wealth/power conditions (M=4.04), F(1, 364)= 45.20, p < 
.00.  
Pre- Deliberation Analyses 
 Before deliberations, participants were not aware of any differences in the diversity of 
their groups. Therefore for all pre-deliberation analyses, I used a 2 (Wealth/power: high vs. low) 
x 2 (Case strength: strong vs. weak) between subjects factorial design.  
 Verdicts. Before deliberations, 47% of jurors voted to convict the defendant. I used a 





case strength or wealth/power group membership on jurors’ verdicts before deliberations.  In the 
first step I entered the two main effects (power and case strength), and at the second step entered 
the interaction between the two variables. The omnibus test was significant, χ2(2, N = 365) = 
77.83, p < .01, Nagelkerke R2 = .26 at the first step. There was a significant main effect of case 
strength on pre-deliberation verdicts, Wald χ2(1, N = 365) = 67.02, p  < .00, Exp(B) = 7.46, 95% 
CI [4.61, 12.07].  The ratio of guilty verdicts to not guilty verdicts in the strong case condition 
was 7.46 times higher than the ratio of guilty to not guilty verdicts in the weak case. In the strong 
case condition 68% of participants voted guilty, with only 22% of participants voting guilty in 
the weak case. No other main effects or interactions had significant effects on pre-deliberation 
verdicts.   
Continuous guilt measures. After analyzing the dichotomous verdicts, I examined the 
continuous guilt measures. I calculated a verdict confidence measure to create a continuous scale 
from -100 (extremely confident in not guilty verdict) to +100 (extremely confident in guilty 
verdict), as in Study 1. I conducted a 2 (Power: high wealth/power vs. low wealth/power) x 2 
(Case strength: high vs. low) ANOVA on the confidence in verdict measure. The 2 x 2 ANOVA 
revealed a significant main effect for case strength, F(1, 350) = 99.09, p < .00, ηp
2 = .22. 
Participants delivered higher guilt ratings in the strong case (M= 30.09) compared to in the weak 
case (M = -46.81). Neither the main effect for the power manipulation nor the interaction 
between case strength and power were significant, F(1, 350) <  2.00, ps > .05.  
Witness ratings. After reverse coding the necessary items, I combined the scales for all 
witness ratings so that higher scores corresponded with more positive ratings. First I examined 
the effects of the independent variables on the ratings of the detective (α= .85). A 2 (Power) x 2 





effect for case strength such that participants who viewed the strong case provided more positive 
ratings of the detective (M = 4.55) than did participants who viewed the weak case (M = 4.28), 
F(1, 348)= 4.90, p = 03, ηp
2 = .02. No other main effects or interactions are significant, ps >.2.  
I also performed the 2 x 2 ANOVA on participants’ ratings of the defendant (α= .85). 
Similar to the ratings of the detective, there was a main effect of case strength on the ratings of 
the defendant, F(1, 349) = 103.78, p < .01, ηp
2 = .23. Participants who viewed the strong case 
rated the defendant less positively (M = 3.57) than did participants who viewed the weak case (M 
= 4.77). There was no significant main effect for power, and the power by case strength 
interaction was not significant, ps > .5. 
Anticipated social interaction ratings. The participants’ social interaction ratings 
measured how comfortable they expected to feel during the upcoming deliberation. I recoded the 
necessary items so that higher scores on the scale reflected that participants expected to feel 
more comfortable during the upcoming interaction. A 2 (Case strength) x 2 (Wealth/power) 
ANOVA on the ratings of anticipated social interaction revealed no main effects of case strength 
or wealth/power on the ratings of how comfortable participants expected to feel during the 
deliberations. However, there was an interaction between case strength and wealth/power, F(1, 
363) = 4.06, p <.05, ηp
2 = .01.  Pairwise comparisons did not reveal any simple main effects but 
for low wealth/power individuals, they anticipated feeling more comfortable when they viewed 
the strong case (M = 6.77) than when they viewed the weak case, (M= 6.51), d = .262, p = .27, 
95%CI[-.20, ,73]. This trend was reversed for high power individuals with those viewing the 
strong case feeling less comfortable (M= 6.40) than did high power participants in the weak case. 






 Individual juror verdicts. After deliberations 36% of participants voted to convict the 
defendant. To examine the effects of the independent variables and deliberations on the 
individual verdicts, I conducted a linear mixed model regression with individual juror verdicts as 
the outcome measure. First, I examined the null model with jury as a random intercept only to 
determine how much variance was due to jury group membership. The intra-class correlation 
was .75, indicating that 75% of the variance in the model was due to group membership. The 
mean reliability estimates within groups was 95%, indicating a strong relationship between jury 
group members on their post-deliberation verdicts. 
 I then conducted a linear mixed model regression using the R program lme4, and the 
function “glmer” with the family binomial analyses regressions with binary outcomes. The 
results revealed a main effect of case strength, z = -2.24, p  < .05, 95% CI [-9.77, -.66]. 
Participants in the strong case were more likely to vote guilty (54%) than were participants in the 
weak case (14%). No other main effects or interactions reached significance in the model, ps 
>.05.  
 Continuous guilt measures. For the continuous guilt measures I used a nested ANOVA 
with jury group as the nesting variable to account for jury-level variance in the models. First, I 
tested the effect of the continuous confidence in verdict measure. The verdict confidence 
measure ranted from -100 (100% confidence in not guilty verdict) to 100 (100% confidence in 
guilty verdict). I then performed a nested ANOVA with the error for the model nested within 
juries. The analysis revealed a significant effect of case strength, F(1, 61.51)= 20.94, p < .01,  
ηp
2= .25, with participants in the strong case reporting higher guilt-confidence ratings (M= 12.77) 
than did participants in the weak case (M= -63.70). No other main effects or interactions were 





 Post-jnteraction ratings. Prior to deliberations, I observed an interaction between case 
strength and power on participants’ ratings of how comfortable they were during the interaction. 
I combined all items on the post-interaction scale and recoded any so that higher scores 
corresponded with having felt more comfortable during the deliberations (α = .86). After 
deliberations, there was no longer a significant interaction on ratings of how comfortable 
participants felt after the interaction. However, there was a significant main effect of case 
strength, F(1, 104.56) = 6.60, p= .01, ηp
2= .06. Participants in the weak case conditions reported 
feeling more comfortable (M= 6.20) than did participants in the strong case (M= 5.88). No other 
main effects or interactions were significant, ps >.08.  
 Trust in system ratings. For the nested ANOVA on trust in the system scale (α = .77) 
there was a significant main effect of case strength, F(1, 98.89)= 6.12, p = .02,  ηp
2= .06. 
Participants who viewed the strong case rated their trust in the system as higher (M= 3.55) than 
did those who viewed the weak case (M= 3.18). No other main effects or interactions were 
significant, ps  >.1. 
Quality of Deliberations Measures 
 Deliberations coding. Although jurors deliberated in 60 juries, I had technical problems 
and lost 2 of the jury videos, leaving 58 juries. As in Study 1, those juries were transcribed (by a 
transcription company) and then divided into units. Units consisted of an argument and any 
accompanying justification. Overall, there were 3,305 units determined from the 58 juries. The 
mean number of units per juror was 9.50 (SD = 9.53).  Those units were then coded for purpose 
and quality. The Cohen’s Kappa for agreement between coders was .83, indicating a high level 





 First, I examined the number of units per juror. I conducted a 2 (Power) x 2 (Diversity) x 
2 (Strength of case) nested ANOVA to determine any main effects or interactions on the number 
of units per juror. The results of the nested ANOVA revealed no significant main effects or 
interactions (ps > .05).  
 I then evaluated the effects of the independent variables on the number of sufficient units 
per juror.  Sufficient units met the requirement of either being derived directly from the 
evidence, or a reasonable inference from the evidence. I used the number of sufficient units per 
juror as my outcome measure, and conducted a 2 x 2 x 2 nested ANOVA to account for the error 
due to jury groups. The nested ANOVA revealed no significant main effects or interactions for 
any of the predictor variables.   
 I then evaluated the effects of the independent variables on the argument type contained 
in the units. Units supported the chosen, discounted the alternative, discounted the chosen, or 
supported the alternative. I only report the analyses for categories with significant results on 
diversity or wealth/power. 
 For discounting the chosen verdict, there was a significant main effect of power, F(1, 
95.67) = 4.99, p = .03, ηp
2 = .05. Participants in the high wealth/power condition provided more 
units discounting their chosen verdict (M= .39) than did participants in the low wealth/power 
condition (M= .16). No other main effects or interactions were significant, ps >.05 
 For supporting an alternative verdict, there was a significant main effect for diversity, 
F(1, 96.13) = 4.32, p = .04, ηp
2 = .04. Participants who deliberated in diverse juries provided 
more units supporting an alternative verdict (M = .56) than did participants deliberating in non-
diverse juries (M = .26). There was also a power by case strength interaction, F(1, 96.05) = 5.95, 
p =.02, ηp





vs. ..50), d = -.28, p = .08, 95% CI [-.59, .03], but in the weak case, high wealth/power 
individuals provided more arguments supporting an alternative verdict (M= .51) than did low 
wealth/power individuals (M= .18), d = .35, p = .03, 95% CI [.03, .66]. 
I combined the remaining categories in the same manner as in Study 1. Therefore, I 
created five categories: Supporting-Facts, Supporting-Reasoning, Discounting-Inconsistent, 
Discounting Evidence, and “missing evidence.”  
There was a significant effect of diversity in the Supporting-Reasoning category. In the 
Supporting-Reasoning category, in which participants engaged in higher level reasoning by 
bringing in outside knowledge or judging evidence to be more credible, I found a significant 
main effect of diversity, F(1, 91.09)= 4.56, p < .05 ηp
2 = .03. Participants in the diverse juries 
provided significantly more supporting-reasoning units (M = 1.42) than did participants in the 
non-diverse juries (M = .88). 
For number of units containing case facts, there was a significant interaction between 
diversity and case strength found in the 2 x 2 x 2 nested ANOVA, F(1, 91.39) = 5.23, p = .02, ηp
2 
= .05. Follow up tests revealed that in the strong case, participants in diverse juries provided 
more units with case facts (M= .56) than did participants in non-diverse juries (M=.36), d = -.29, 
p = .02, 95%CI [-.53, -.05]. In the weak case, this difference was not significant (Ms= .35 vs. 
.53), d = .21, p = .09, 95%CI [-.45, .03].   
Jury-level analyses 
Jury verdicts. Participants deliberated in 60 juries. Of those 60 juries, 17 (29%) voted to 
convict the defendant, 34 (57%) voted to acquit the defendant, and 9 (15%) remained hung after 
45 minutes. I asked each hung jury to provide a public vote to determine majority vote for each 





voted to convict the defendant. I performed jury-level analyses on the verdicts using the majority 
counts. 
First, I performed a binary logistic regression examining the effects of the conditions on 
jury verdicts. I entered the two dummy-coded diversity variables in the first step, along with the 
strength of case predictor. I then included interactions between strength of case and each of the 
dummy-coded diversity conditions in the second step. The omnibus test was significant, χ2(3, N 
= 60) = 25.35, p < .01, Nagelkerke R2 = .48. In the first step, there was a main effect of case 
strength, Wald χ2(1, N = 60) = 15.20, p < .01, Exp(B) = 20.51, 95% CI [.01, .22]. The ratio of 
guilty to not guilty verdicts was 20.51 times higher in the strong than the weak case. In the strong 
case, 19 (63%) juries voted guilty, compared to only 3 (10%) juries in the weak case. Also in the 
first step, there was a significant main effect for the dummy-coded non-diverse low 
wealth/power condition, Wald χ2(1, N = 60) = 3.90, p < .05, Exp(B) = .18, 95% CI [.03, .99].  In 
the non-diverse low wealth/power condition the ratio of guilty to not verdicts was .18 times 
lower in the diverse condition than in the non-diverse high wealth/power condition. In the 
diverse condition, 4 (20%) of juries voted guilty compared to 9 (47%) in the low wealth/power 
diversity condition. The main effect for the dummy-coded non-diverse high wealth/power 
condition compared to the diverse condition approached significance in the same pattern as the 
non-diverse low power main effect, Wald χ2(1, N = 60) = 3.60, p = .06, Exp(B) = .19, 95% CI 
[.04, 1.06]. For the non-diverse high power juries, 9 (43%) voted to convict the defendant, 
compared to 4 (20%) in the diverse condition.   
Length of deliberations. Additionally, I examined the length of deliberations in Study 2. 
The 2 (Diversity) x 2 (Strength of case) ANOVA revealed no significant main effects or 





Chapter 15: Study 2 Discussion 
 My goal for Study 2 was to examine the effects of diversity in wealth and power on jury 
deliberations.  I manipulated the wealth and power (simultaneously) of participants to mimic the 
power differentials that could occur in deliberations when jurors have different statuses in 
society. I predicted an interaction between case strength and diversity conditions, which would 
reflect higher quality evidence evaluation in diverse groups compared to non-diverse ones.  
There were significant main effects for case strength throughout my analysis, suggesting that the 
case strength manipulation was successful; however there were there were no significant 
interactions between the strength of case and the diversity conditions on either juror or jury 
verdicts. Similar to the results in Study 1, I did not find evidence to support my primary 
hypothesis, that diverse juries (and jurors deliberating in diverse juries) would be more sensitive 
to evidence strength than non-diverse juries and jurors deliberating in non-diverse juries.  
 There are several possible explanations for diversity’s lack of impact on the sensitivity to 
evidence strength. First of all, while the conviction rate in the second study was not quite as low 
as it was in the first study, there was an overall low conviction rate, and this may have reduced 
my ability to detect differences. No previous research has documented diversity’s ability to 
improve sensitivity to evidence strength, so it is possible that diversity does not improve 
sensitivity to evidence strength. Previous research has documented how diversity improves the 
quality of deliberations discussions (Sommers, 2006), but this may not translate to more accurate 
verdicts. The more likely scenario, however, is that the low conviction rate and the shift towards 






Also, in support of the benefits of diversity, jurors deliberating in diverse juries provided 
more contributions on several of the quality of deliberation reasoning measures than jurors in 
non-diverse juries. Participants deliberating in diverse juries provided more units containing case 
facts, were more likely to discount the alternative opinion, and were more likely to use higher 
level reasoning arguments to support a verdict choice than were jurors deliberating in non-
diverse juries. Consistent with Study 1, and with the Sommers (2006) data, jurors deliberating in 
diverse juries tend to out-perform jurors deliberating in non-diverse juries, reflected in more high 
quality contributions to jury deliberations.  
I did not, however, find evidence of higher quality deliberations on all deliberation 
quality variables. Unlike in Study 1, I did not find that jurors deliberating in diverse juries 
provided more sufficient units or more discounting arguments. Since sufficient units were all of 
sufficiently high quality, the fact that there were no diversity effects on this variable mean that 
the diversity effect was weaker in the second study than in the first study. Given the nature of the 
manipulation (i.e., simulating wealth and power with monopoly money), this is not entirely 
surprising. It does suggest the need for additional research on this topic to determine the true 
effects of diversity defined as a combination of wealth/power groups.  
It is important to note there were jury level effects for the diversity conditions. Juries in 
the non-diverse low wealth/power condition were more likely to vote to convict the defendant 
than were juries in the diverse condition. Thus, low wealth/power groups were more punitive 
than the diverse juries. Additionally, the high wealth/power condition exhibited the same trend 
(i.e., non-diverse high wealth/power juries were more punitive than diverse juries) so diversity 
likely caused this leniency in verdicts. Although deliberations have been demonstrated to 





previously that diversity in jury group composition increases leniency overall. Lynch and Haney 
(2011) did find that diverse juries (i.e., juries containing more minorities and women) were more 
lenient towards minority defendants. For all conditions in the present study the defendant was 
Hispanic, so it could be that diverse juries tend to be more lenient towards minority defendants.  
The power manipulation also affected participants’ contributions to deliberations. 
Participants who had been assigned to the high wealth/power group made significantly more 
arguments supporting the alternative verdict and discounting the chosen verdict than participants 
in the low power group. High wealth/power individuals may have felt more comfortable and 
powerful than low power individuals, and this may have contributed to their expression of high 
levels of reasoning. Galinsky et al. (2008) suggests that high power group members tend to feel 
more comfortable expressing their opinions in group situations, which could explain this finding. 
Previous research also finds that higher social status (i.e., education levels, income) tends to 
correspond with more participation in jury deliberation proceedings (Hastie et al., 1983; York & 
Cornwell, 2006). 
 In the strong case the low wealth/power individuals anticipated feeling more comfortable 
about the upcoming jury deliberations than did individuals in high wealth/power condition, and 
in the weak case this pattern was reversed. Low wealth/power individuals may have identified 
with the defendant (an “underdog”), and therefore felt more comfortable going into a 
deliberation in which they felt the defendant was guilty because they saw the defendant as an 
ingroup member. For high wealth/power individuals, they saw the defendant as an outgroup 
member, so they may have felt more comfortable entering deliberations in which they were 





 Similar to the results of Study 1, participants’ ratings of trust in the system were affected 
by the strength of the evidence in the case. Participants who viewed the strong case rated their 
trust in the system as higher than those who viewed the weak case. This finding demonstrates 
that experiences with the justice system have the potential to impact people’s perceptions of the 
fairness in the justice system, which is supported by research on racial attitudes toward the police 
and other legal actors (Overby et al., 2005; Weitzer & Tuch, 2005). 
Limitations 
 Study 2 was not without its limitations. Similar to Study 1, there were unexpected 
strength of case effects on the quality of deliberations and interactions with diversity, due to the 
weakness of the weak case. In the weak case we did not detect diversity effects for the most part, 
which likely occurred because the jurors already agreed upon entering deliberations. The ease 
with which jurors were able to agree on the final verdict in the weak case hindered the 
development of more meaningful discussion, and diluted some of our effects in terms of quality 
of deliberations. Also with a low post-deliberation conviction rate, we likely experienced floor 
effects on post-deliberation verdicts and guilt ratings which made it more difficult to detect 
differences between groups.  
 Another limitation to the second study was the manipulation of wealth and power. 
Although the manipulation check measures suggested that these manipulations did make jurors 
feel more or less wealthy and powerful, this was a very weak manipulation of wealth and power, 
compared to the impact of true wealth and power in the real world. Although possessing 
monopoly money has been demonstrated to increase feelings of wealth (Harvey & Bourhis, 
2012), having false money cannot accurately replicate the experience of actual wealth and social 





distinctions suggest that the potential for wealth and power to impact jury groups might be 
immense.  
 The weakness of some of the diversity effects is an important limitation of this study’s 
findings. In Study 1 there were significant diversity effects on several of the key categories 
demonstrating high levels of reasoning, but in Study 2 this was not the case. While I observed 
some diversity effects on the quality of deliberations measures, this was true for fewer categories 
than in the previous study. Additionally, jurors deliberating in diverse juries did not outperform 
those in non-diverse juries on the measures of sufficient units, and discounting of alternative 
arguments, which are two critical categories for establishing higher quality deliberations. We 
should be hesitant to draw too strong conclusions from this one study, and future research should 
explore how robust the wealth/power diversity effect truly is. 
 Another limitation in this study was the fact that my sample was made up of college 
students, who generally do not possess as much experience with the justice system and trial 
procedures as community members. This could explain the difference in conviction rates 
between the students and community members, although these cannot be directly compared as 
they were two separate studies. Also the students were all psychology majors studying at the 
same university, which means some of them may have been familiar to each other outside of the 
study. This is an important limitation to consider, because interactions with familiar individuals 
might be different than the interactions with strangers you might experience in jury duty.  Using 
a student population also means that although I manipulated diversity of access to power and 
wealth, the age of participants was not diverse. Additionally, my sample was ethnically diverse 





sensitive to these issues, and this wealth/power manipulation would not be as effective with a 
less diverse sample. 
Conclusions 
 The second study did not find that jurors in diverse juries were more sensitive to case 
strength than those in non-diverse juries. The results revealed, however, that diversity did 
improve the quality of deliberations on some of the measures, although the diversity effects on 
the quality of deliberation measures were not as strong as in Study 1. Similar to the results in the 
first study any diversity benefits occurred for both high and low power individuals, indicating 
that both high and low social status individuals benefit from deliberating in diverse juries. 
Diverse juries were also less punitive than non-diverse low power juries, which indicates that 
diverse juries may be more lenient that non-diverse juries, particularly towards a minority 
defendant. Also, high wealth/power participants provided more units supporting the alternative 
verdict and discounting the chosen verdict, suggesting that members of high social status groups 






Chapter 16: Conclusions and Future Directions 
 Overall, the results of these two studies add to the literature finding that diverse jury 
deliberations are higher in quality than are the deliberations in homogenous ones. This research 
was designed to test several novel hypotheses. The first goal was to study the impact of diversity 
on the quality of deliberations defined as sensitivity to evidence strength. The second goal was to 
investigate the impact of diversity on mock jurors who were members of minority groups. 
Additionally this research sought to examine diversity defined as members of an experimentally 
designed group, by experimentally manipulating wealth and power.  
In the first study I tested the hypothesis that diversity would improve the quality of 
deliberations for both minority and majority mock jurors, with diversity defined as sensitivity to 
the strength of the evidence. I did not find support for my hypothesis that diverse juries would be 
more sensitive to the strength of evidence than non-diverse juries. I found no interactions 
between evidence strength and diversity. The main effect of evidence strength, however, was 
strong and pervasive, possibly indicating that jurors were sensitive to the quality of evidence 
without the help of diversity. I also had a very low post-deliberation conviction rate, making it 
difficult to detect differences between groups. Another possible explanation is that the amount of 
variance explained by jury group membership (within group variance) was large and may have 
overpowered any effects of diversity on verdicts and guilt measures.  
It is also possible that diversity does not improve sensitivity to case strength. Sommers 
(2006) also did not find evidence of verdict differences based on the composition of the jury, and 
studies finding that diversity impacts verdicts suggest that most of the effects lie in the increased 
likelihood of juries composed of a higher percentage of White males to deliver more punitive 





the group deliberation effect is so immense that we cannot detect diversity effects. For instance, 
Kalven and Zeisel (1966) found that pre-deliberation guilt votes were the greatest predictor of 
jury verdicts, with most of the juries eventually siding with the initial majority. Group effects 
may be more prominent than diversity effects for deliberating juries. 
In the first study, I also hypothesized that diversity would improve the quality of the 
deliberation discussion. Using a previously established coding scheme (Kuhn et al., 1994), I 
examined the content of deliberations along a number of different reasoning dimensions. I hoped 
to expand upon previous findings that diverse juries deliberated for longer, reported more case 
facts, and made fewer errors, among other criteria (Sommers, 2006). My hypothesis that jurors 
deliberating in diverse juries would provide more high quality units than non-diverse juries was 
largely supported. Jurors who deliberated in diverse juries contributed more sufficient quality 
units, and more high-level reasoning arguments supporting a verdict, than jurors deliberating in 
non-diverse juries. Diversity appeared to improve deliberations in a similar manner for both 
Black and White participants. Diversity’s impact was mainly driven by White mock jurors in 
previous research (Sommers, 2006). In Sommers (2006), however, the racial make-up of the 
participant sample in the previous study did not allow for a thorough exploration of the effects of 
deliberating in diverse compared to non-diverse juries for Black participants. The finding in the 
current study indicates that the mechanisms used to explain the benefits of diversity may need to 
be expanded. Although concern about prejudice and the watchdog effect (Fleming et al., 2005) 
has been previously used to explain diversity’s benefits, these theories would likely not apply to 
minority jurors. Minorities are not concerned with appearing prejudiced, and instead would be 
more likely to focus on the potential to be the target of prejudice (Mendoza-Denton, et al., 2002). 





Diversity may operate through some more basic mechanisms such as encouraging heterogenous 
perspectives and encouraging different avenues for thought (Nemeth, 1986), or it is possible that 
diversity operates differently for different racial/ethnic groups. 
In the first study I also found some evidence of racial differences in terms of trust in the 
system. Black participants rated the detective more negatively than White participants did, and 
also reported lower trust in the system than White participants, at least in the strong case. These 
findings are consistent with previous research documenting racial minorities’ distrust of the 
police and other legal institutions (Overby et al., 2005; Weitzer & Tuch, 2005). The anticipation 
of unfair outcomes in the system might encourage minority individuals to process information 
more careful, and may even have the potential to interact with diversity. From the results of the 
current study, however, we are unable to determine whether trust in the system is related to 
diversity effects. 
I did not find support for the competing hypothesis that participating in diverse jury 
groups would impair cognitive performance and reduce the quality of decisions made by 
deliberating jurors (Richeson & Shelton, 2003). Although participants planning to engage in 
interracial interactions may often experience decreased cognitive performance, I did not find 
evidence of this performance decrement. I did, however, find that White participants expressed 
more anxiety about deliberating in a jury group than Black participants did. This effect is 
consistent with the idea that concern about appearing prejudiced can increase anxiety about 
upcoming interracial interactions (Goff et al., 2008), although White participants were equally 
anxious about interacting with a same-race group. 
In the second study, I manipulated diversity in a novel way. Specifically, I manipulated 





paradigm (MGP; Harvey & Bourhis, 2012). I predicted that diverse juries made up of high and 
low wealth/power individuals would exhibit higher quality deliberations than non-diverse juries, 
a hypothesis that was partially supported. Jurors who deliberated in diverse juries were not more 
sensitive to case strength than jurors who deliberated in non-diverse juries. 
On the quality of deliberation measures, jurors who deliberated in diverse wealth/power 
juries tended to make contributions to deliberations that reflected a higher level of reasoning than 
did those who deliberated in non-diverse juries, particularly in the strong case. Previous research 
has tested the impact of jury diversity, examining both gender and race as diversity 
characteristics (Lynch & Haney, 2011; Sommers, 2006); however this is the first study to 
examine the impact of manipulated power dynamics on jury diversity. The benefits of diversity 
were not as powerful as in Study 1, but they still provide evidence of a diversity benefit. There 
were also effects of the wealth/power manipulation, such that participants in the high 
wealth/power groups provided more units supporting the alternative verdict and discounting the 
chosen verdict than did participants in low wealth/power groups. This finding is consistent with 
that in previous research finding that high power individuals tend to feel more comfortable 
expressing their opinions during intergroup interactions than members of low power groups 
(Galinsky et al., 2008).  
Interestingly, when it came to diverse juries, they were more likely to be lenient 
compared to non-diverse juries, particularly low power juries. Diverse juries were not more 
sensitive to the quality of evidence, but instead were less punitive towards the defendant. The 
defendant was a minority (Hispanic) in all conditions, so perhaps diversity increased leniency 
towards a minority defendant, similar to the results in Lynch and Haney (2011). However, 





Perhaps adding low power groups however they are defined (e.g., women, minorities, low SES 
individuals) can increase sympathy for low status defendants in a jury deliberation.   
Limitations 
The largest limitation to this study was the weakness of the weak case. In the first study, 
this caused post-deliberation verdicts to be so low in the first study that I could not even detect a 
significant effect for the case strength.  The weakness of the case with the weaker evidence also 
likely diluted the effects of the beneficial impact of diversity, as I mostly found evidence for 
diversity’s benefits for the strong case but not the weak case. The ease with which jurors decided 
the weak case also likely contributed to the unexpected main effect for case strength on most 
quality of deliberation measures, with higher quality deliberations in the strong case in which 
verdicts for jurors were closer to a 50/50 split. The strength of case by diversity interaction on 
the quality of deliberation measures can likely be explained by the fact that the strong case was a 
more ambivalent case, allowing for more movement in either direction. In the weak case the 
deliberations were shorter with fewer high quality units, likely because it was an easier case to 
decide.  
Another limitation is that although diversity was defined in a unique manner, I did not 
examine the impact of diversity for members of racial groups other than Black individuals, 
therefore I cannot draw conclusions about the impact of diversity for other minority groups. 
Studies examining the impact of diversity on jury deliberations should seek to include other 
minority groups in these studies, and study both the impact of diversity on these groups, and also 
the impact of including jurors from these groups in deliberations for White jurors. Black 





Eberhardt & Davies, 2008) and mistreatment at the hands of the justice system (Baldus et al, 
1983), and it is possible that other groups might have different experiences in jury deliberations. 
 Another limitation to this study is the fact that I did not manipulate race of the defendant. 
One of the proposed benefits of increasing diversity in juries is to increase fair outcomes for 
minority individuals. I cannot determine whether there was bias, or whether it was reduced, 
because I do not have comparisons among races. This is similar to previous studies on diversity 
(Sommers, 2006), and perhaps future research can focus on how diversity can reduce bias. 
However, in the second study diverse juries were more lenient towards a Hispanic defendant 
than low power non-diverse juries, suggesting a possible lessening of bias towards a minority 
defendant. With the largest racial/ethnic group in my sample being Hispanic, however, I am 
hesitant to draw a strong conclusion about the racial bias effect. 
Implications 
The courts prescribe several protections against the prejudices of legal decision-makers, 
and the ability of diversity to guard against biased legal decisions is uncontroversial. Many court 
decisions are based on the assumption that diversity and deliberations act to benefit the quality of 
deliberations, correcting for biases and prejudices (Peters v. Kiff, 1972). Increasing the diversity 
of juries also has the ability to improve perceptions of the justice system and increase the 
perceived fairness of racial outcomes. Verdicts delivered by all-White juries tend to be perceived 
as less fair than verdicts delivered by diverse juries (Ellis & Diamond, 2003). The increased 
perceived fairness of verdicts mean that there should be an emphasis on including minority jurors 
in deliberations.  
The findings of diversity benefits for minority jurors are important, as few studies 





the addition of minority group members to all-White juries. This emphasis is logical, as diversity 
is typically proposed as a method to reduce racial bias towards minority defendants. The current 
study is one of the first to examine the deliberations of all-minority juries. It is important to note 
that minority jurors deliberating in diverse juries exhibited higher quality contributions to 
deliberations than minority jurors deliberating in non-diverse juries. The benefit for minorities 
deliberating in diverse juries compared to homogenous juries is a novel finding, and one that 
deserves further exploration. The results of the current study do not clarify the mechanism by 
which diversity improves deliberations for minority group members, but future research should 
delve into this further. The only measure for which we observed racial differences was on the 
trust in the system variables, and it is possible that minority juries are more likely to focus on 
problems in the justice system than are juries consisting of mostly White jurors.   
This research also has important implications for the effects of wealth and power on jury 
deliberations. With a relatively trivial manipulation of power and wealth, we were able to see 
more leniency in diverse juries, and also higher quality deliberations on several dimensions when 
the power and wealth groups deliberated together rather than separately. Additionally, in some 
conditions high wealth/power individuals offered more high-level reasoning units than low 
wealth/power individuals, suggesting that power influences how comfortable jurors feel 
expressing themselves. This is particularly notable in a jury setting, where ones’ wealth and 
power status is irrelevant to the task at hand.  
Future Directions 
 The results of this research provide many avenues for future research. Although the 
finding that diversity improves deliberations is not a novel one (Lynch & Haney, 2011; 





Although racial diversity is an important aspect of diversity, many different types of diversity 
have been demonstrated to improve group decision-making and performance (Gruenfeld, 
Mannix, Williams, & Neale, 1996; Stasser, Stewart, & Wittenbaum, 1995; Watson, Kumar, & 
Michaelsen, 1993). Researchers should continue to examine the role of power and wealth 
dynamics in juries, particularly because power and wealth are so difficult to extricate from race.  
The next direction to take this research might also be to explore the role of diverse jury 
group deliberations in reducing racial bias in jury decisions. In one study, jurors were more 
lenient when they anticipated deliberating in a diverse group than when they deliberated in a 
non-diverse group (Sommers, 2006). Another study showed that adding minorities and women to 
jury proceedings improved outcomes for a minority defendant (Lynch & Haney, 2011). Would 
this effect still occur if the defendant were not the same race as the minority group jurors?  The 
results of the present research suggest that diverse juries might be more lenient towards any 
defendant, or perhaps any minority defendant.  
 Another direction to explore jury diversity might be to examine the impact of diversity 
from an interracial interactions perspective. Perhaps the common goal and the script of a jury 
deliberation with the goal of reaching a unanimous decision are sufficient factors to reduce the 
uncertainty and anxiety that characterizes most interracial interactions (Avery et al., 2009). 
Perhaps there are certain cases that would be more likely to increase anxiety about interacting in 
diverse groups, such as raising the potential for racial issues to come into play, which might 
interfere with diversity’s benefits (Goff et al., 2008).  
 The most important direction we should take from this research is to build on the 
literature finding evidence of diversity’s ability to improve deliberations (Lynch & Haney, 2011; 





and White individuals make higher quality contributions to deliberations when they participate in 
diverse juries compared to when they participate in homogenous juries. Additionally, previous 
research documents the ability of the watchdog effect to promote better information-processing 
in White jurors deliberating in diverse groups, sometimes even prior to deliberations (Sommers, 
2006; Sommers, et al., 2008). The current research suggests that a lack of trust in the system, or 
being vigilant about the potential for injustice, may encourage minority jurors to process 
evidence more carefully. Minorities may be more sensitive to potential injustice when 
deliberating in a diverse group, believing that majority group members may be biased against 
minorities. Future research should explore the mechanism by which minority jurors make more 
high quality contributions to jury deliberations, and determine whether diversity’s benefit 
operates through information-processing. Perhaps heterogeneity of perspectives and ideas is the 
mechanism by which diversity improves deliberations, or perhaps minorities and majority group 
members benefit from diversity through different mechanisms. 
Conclusion 
 The courts often tout the importance of including all jurors in deliberations, and hope that 
diverse juries will protect minority jurors from unfair outcomes, and most research suggests that 
this faith is rightly placed (Lynch & Haney, 2011; Sommers, 2006). The current study supports 
the view that jurors will deliberate better in diverse juries than in non-diverse juries, and this 
study finds evidence of this among two definitions of diversity.  This study suggests that jurors 
deliberate better in diverse juries whether diversity as racial diversity or wealth and power. The 
results of the current study suggest that we need to focus on re-defining the mechanism by which 





individuals, whereas much research touting diversity has emphasized Whites’ high levels of 
information processing in interracial situations.  
 Overall, this research supports the courts’ assumption that diverse deliberations will serve 
to improve jury decision-making and reduce bias against low power and minority defendants. 
The prevention of minorities from serving on juries not only violates individual rights, but is also 
a disservice to the quality of jury deliberations. This research highlights the fact that failed 
Batson challenges, and the removal of minorities from juries, can severely impact the quality of 
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Study 1 coding criteria descriptive statistics 
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Study 2 Pre-deliberation guilty verdict descriptive statistics 
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Study 2 coding criteria descriptive statistics 
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Appendix A: Post-Trial Questionnaire 
 
POST-TRIAL QUESTIONNAIRE  
 
 
1. Do you find the defendant, Mr. Frank Johnson guilty or not guilty of first degree murder? 
(CIRCLE ONE) 
 
 Guilty Not Guilty 
 
2. On a scale from 0% - 100%, how confident are you in your verdict?_______ % confident 
 
 
3. Give a percentage between 0% and 100%. What is the probability that the defendant, Mr. 
Frank Johnson, committed first degree murder? ________________% 
 
 
Please indicate whether you agree or disagree with the following statements by choosing 
the number on the scale corresponding to your belief. 
 
1. The defense had a very strong case.    
 




2. The evidence against the defendant was very strong. 
 




Next, we would like you to describe your impressions of witnesses that you heard using a 
series of adjective pairs.  The scales are designed so that you can express the degree to 
which the person that you are rating seems to fit one end of the scale or the other.  Which 
space you check should depend on the degree to which the word describes the person you 
are rating.   
 
For example, if you thought that Jane was slightly tall, you would mark the item as follows: 
 
 Tall : : : : X : : : : Short 
 
However, if you thought that Jane was extremely short, you should place the “X” next to short: 
 










Based on the testimony that you heard, carefully rate your impressions of Detective Andrea 
Jones as best you can on each of the following dimensions:  
 
 trustworthy : : : : : : : : untrustworthy 
 
 honest : : : : : : : : dishonest 
   
 attractive : : : : : : : : unattractive 
 
not believable : : : : : : : : believable 
 
 convincing : : : : : : : : unconvincing 
 
 certain : : : : : : : : uncertain 
 
 
Based on the testimony that you heard, carefully rate your impressions of David Cross (the 
medical examiner) as best you can on each of the following dimensions:  
 
 trustworthy : : : : : : : : untrustworthy 
 
 honest : : : : : : : : dishonest 
   
 attractive : : : : : : : : unattractive 
 
not believable : : : : : : : : believable 
 
 convincing : : : : : : : : unconvincing 
 
 certain : : : : : : : : uncertain 
 
 
Based on the testimony that you heard, carefully rate your impressions of Brian Connolly 
(the bartender) as best you can on each of the following dimensions: 
 
 trustworthy : : : : : : : : untrustworthy 
 
 honest : : : : : : : : dishonest 
   






not believable : : : : : : : : believable 
 
 convincing : : : : : : : : unconvincing 
 




Based on the testimony that you heard, carefully rate your impressions of Jack Healy (the 
friend of the defendant) as best you can on each of the following dimensions:  
 
 trustworthy : : : : : : : : untrustworthy 
 
 honest : : : : : : : : dishonest 
   
 attractive : : : : : : : : unattractive 
 
not believable : : : : : : : : believable 
 
 convincing : : : : : : : : unconvincing 
 
 certain : : : : : : : : uncertain 
 
Based on the testimony that you heard, carefully rate your impressions of Rebecca Tyler 
(the waitress) as best you can on each of the following dimensions:  
 
 trustworthy : : : : : : : : untrustworthy 
 
 honest : : : : : : : : dishonest 
   
 attractive : : : : : : : : unattractive 
 
not believable : : : : : : : : believable 
 
 convincing : : : : : : : : unconvincing 
 
 certain : : : : : : : : uncertain 
 
Based on the testimony that you heard, carefully rate your impressions of Frank Johnson 
(the defendant) as best you can on each of the following dimensions:  
 
 trustworthy : : : : : : : : untrustworthy 
 
 honest : : : : : : : : dishonest 
   






not believable : : : : : : : : believable 
 
 convincing : : : : : : : : unconvincing 
 
 certain : : : : : : : : uncertain 
 
You will now be deliberating in a jury group. You will be instructed to discuss the evidence 
in the case, and then come to a unanimous verdict decision. We are interested in your 
honest thoughts and feelings about how this conversation will go. Please indicate whether 
you agree or disagree with the following statements by choosing the number on the scale 
corresponding to your belief. 
 
1. I will feel self-conscious during this interaction. 
 
1                2                   3             4           5          6                 7      
Strongly                                                                                             Strongly 
Disagree                             Agree 
 
2. I am worried I will not be able to talk comfortably. 
 
      1                2                   3             4           5          6                 7      
Strongly                                                                                               Strongly 
Disagree                               Agree 
 
3. I will feel comfortable during this interaction. 
 
      1                2                   3             4           5          6                 7      
Strongly                                                                                               Strongly 
Disagree                                Agree 
 
4. I will be able to “be myself” during this interaction. 
 
       1                2                   3             4           5          6                 7      
Strongly                                                                                               Strongly 
Disagree                               Agree 
 
5. I will feel accepted during this interaction. 
 
      1                2                   3             4           5          6                 7      
Strongly                                                                                               Strongly 
Disagree                                Agree 
 







      1                2                   3             4           5          6                 7      
Strongly                                                                                               Strongly 
Disagree                              Agree 
 
7. I will feel comfortable telling the other jurors when I disagree with their views. 
 
      1                2                   3             4           5          6                 7      
Strongly                                                                                               Strongly 
Disagree                              Agree 
 
8. I will not feel comfortable arguing for the verdict that I believe is correct. 
 
      1                2                   3             4           5          6                 7      
Strongly                                                                                               Strongly 






Appendix B: Post-Deliberation Questionnaire 
POST-DELIBERATION QUESTIONNAIRE 
 
1. Do you find the defendant, Mr. Frank Johnson guilty or not guilty of first degree murder? 
(CIRCLE ONE) 
 
 Guilty Not Guilty 
 
2. On a scale from 0% - 100%, how confident are you in your verdict?_______ % confident 
 
3. What is the probability that the defendant (0%-100% probability, Mr. Frank Johnson, 
committed first degree murder? ________________% 
 
 
Please indicate whether you agree or disagree with the following statements by choosing 
the number on the scale corresponding to your belief. 
 
1. The defense had a very strong case.    
 




2. The prosecution had a very strong case.   
 




Please indicate your agreement with the following statements. 
 
1. Even though I didn’t agree with the other jurors, I felt pressure to go along with their 
verdict. 
 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  
Strongly Strongly 
Disagree                           Agree 
 
2. I convinced at least one of my fellow jurors to change their verdict. 
 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  
Strongly      Strongly 







3. If this was an actual trial, I would have fought harder to convince my fellow jurors that 
the defendant was [guilty/not guilty]. 
 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  
Strongly Strongly 
Disagree                                                           Agree 
 
 
You have just finished deliberating in a jury group. We are interested in your honest 
thoughts and feelings about how this deliberation session went. Please state your agreement 
with the following statements: 
 
1. I felt self-conscious during this deliberation.    
 
      1                2                   3             4           5          6                 7      
Strongly                                                                                                          Strongly 
Disagree                                           Agree 
 
2.  I felt comfortable during the deliberations. 
 
      1                2                   3             4           5          6                 7      
Strongly                                                                                                        Strongly 
Disagree                                        Agree 
 
3. I felt like I could “be myself” during deliberations. 
 
      1                2                   3             4           5          6                 7      
Strongly                                                                                                             Strongly 
Disagree                                              Agree 
 
4. I felt accepted during deliberations. 
 
      1                2                   3             4           5          6                 7      
Strongly                                                                                                         Strongly 
Disagree                                         Agree 
 
5. I felt like others listened to me during the deliberations. 
 
      1                2                   3             4           5          6                 7      
Strongly                                                                                                            Strongly 









6. I felt comfortable sharing my views and perspectives about the case with the other jurors. 
 
      1                2                   3             4           5          6                 7      
Strongly                                                                                                             Strongly 
Disagree                                             Agree 
 
7. I felt comfortable telling the other jurors when I disagreed with their views. 
 
      1                2                   3             4           5          6                 7      
Strongly                                                                                                             Strongly 
Disagree                                             Agree 
 
8. I did not feel comfortable arguing for the verdict that I believed was correct. 
 
      1                2                   3             4           5          6                 7      
Strongly                                                                                                          Strongly 
Disagree                                                Agree 
 
Please indicate your agreement with the following statements: 
 
1. If a suspect runs from police, then he probably committed the crime. 
 
      1                2                   3             4           5          6                 7      
Strongly                                                                                                         Strongly 
Disagree                                         Agree 
 
2. Out of every 100 people brought to trial, at least 75 are guilty of the crime with which they 
are charged. 
 
      1                2                   3             4           5          6                 7      
Strongly                                                                                                          Strongly 
Disagree                                          Agree 
 
3. Generally, the police make an arrest only when they are sure about who committed the crime. 
 
      1                2                   3             4           5          6                 7      
Strongly                                                                                                          Strongly 
Disagree                                               Agree 
 
4. A prior record of conviction is the best indicator of a person’s guilt in the present case. 
 
      1                2                   3             4           5          6                 7      
Strongly                                                                                                             Strongly 
Disagree                                               Agree 
 






      1                2                   3             4           5          6                 7      
Strongly                                                                                                          Strongly 
Disagree                                           Agree 
 
6. If a witness refuses to take a lie detector test, it is because he/she is hiding something. 
 
      1                2                   3             4           5          6                 7      
Strongly                                                                                                     Strongly 
Disagree                                        Agree   
 
 
Please answer the following questions to the best of your ability: 
 





e. Don’t remember 
 




d. No Weapon 
 






4. Which of the following did the expert testify about: 
a. The time of death 
b. The bullet pattern 
c. The direction of the knife 
d. Whether the victim had a heart attack 
 
5. Which of the following characterizes the defense’s case: 
a. Insanity Plea 
b. Self-Defense 
c. Crime of passion 







Appendix C: Kuhn, Weinstock & Flaton (1994) Coding Sheet Revised  
 
1. Participant Number _________________        
2. Jury Number ____________________     Unit Number __________________ 
3. Opinion reached by the juror 
1 = Guilty 
0 = Not Guilty 
Function: What is the purpose of the unit? 
4. Jusverd: The function of the unit was to justify the chosen opinion. 
1 = yes (If 1, enter 0 for 5-7) 
0 = no (If 0, go to 5) 
5. Disaltv: The function of the unit was to discount an alternative opinion 
1 = yes (If 1, enter 0 for 6-7) 
0 = no (If 0, go to 6) 
6. disver: The function of the unit was to discount the chosen opinion 
1 = yes (If 1, enter 0 for 7) 
0 = no (If 0, go to 7) 
7. supalt: The function of the unit was to support an alternative opinion 
1 = support an alternative opinion 
0 = DID NOT support an alternative opinion 
Quality 
8. Legit 
1 = Legitimate  
0 = Illegitimate  
9. Relevanc 
1 = Relevant  
0 = Not Relevant  
10. Suff 
1 = Sufficient – scored a 1 on legit AND relevanc 
0 = Deficient – scored a 0 on EITHER legit OR relevanc 
SUPPORTING  
Nonjudgmental 
11. Factual (Snjfact) 
1 = yes; 0 = no 
12. Narrative (Snjnarr) 
1 = yes; 0 = no 
Judgmental 
13. Importing (sjimpor)  
1 = yes; 0 = no 
14. Credibility (sjcred)  
1 = yes; 0 = no 
DISCOUNTING 
Inconsistent 
15. Nonjudgmental – factual (dincnj) 





16. Judgmental – importing (dincjud) 
1 = yes; 0 = no 
Discounting of evidence 
17. Judgmental – importing (Dunjimp) 
1 = yes; 0 = no 
18. Judgmental – credibility (Dunjcre) 






Appendix D: Kuhn, Weinstock & Flaton (1994) Coding Scheme Revised  
 
Coding Sheet for Units   
 
We are coding three things:  
 
1. the function of the unit (the purpose it was intended to serve; 4-7) 
2. the quality of the unit (legitimate, relevance, sufficient; 8-10) 
3. the type of the argument in the unit (supporting vs. discounting, 11-18) 
 
Also, before you begin coding, read through the expert report to make sure you know what the 
final opinion is (to help you code for supporting vs. discounting arguments).  
 
19. Participant: Participant Number 
20. Opinion: Opinion reached by the juror 
a. 1 = Guilty 
b. 0 = Not guilty 
 
Function: What is the purpose of the unit? 
 
21. Jusverd: The function of the unit was to justify the chosen opinion. 
a. 1 = yes 
b. 0 = no 
i. If 1, enter 0 for 5-7 
ii. If 0, go to 5 
22. Disaltv: The function of the unit was to discount an alternative opinion 
a. 1 = yes 
b. 0 = no 
i. If 1, enter 0 for 6-7 
ii. If 0, go to 6 
23. disver: The function of the unit was to discount the chosen opinion 
a. 1 = yes 
b. 0 = no 
i. If 1, enter 0 for 7 
ii. If 0, go to 7 
24. supalt: The function of the unit was to support an alternative opinion 
a. 1 = The function of the unit was to support an alternative opinion 




25. Legit: Legitimate vs. Illegitimate 
a. 1 = Legitimate – the evidence is either drawn directly from the trial or consistutes 





b. 0 = Illegitimate – the evidence is not either drawn directly from trial or constitutes 
a reasonable inference drawn from testimony 
26. Relevanc: Relevant v. Not Relevant 
a. 1 = Relevant – the evidence either increases or decreases the probability that the 
criteria associated with the opinion are met 
b. 0 = Not Relevant – the evidence does not either increases or decreases the 
probability that the criteria associated with the opinion are met 
27. Suff: Sufficient vs. deficient. NOTE: to be sufficient, the statement must also be 
legitimate and relevant 
a. 1 = Sufficient – scored a 1 on legit AND relevanc 
b. 0 = Deficient – scored a 0 on EITHER legit OR relevanc 
 
ONLY THOSE ITEMS THAT ARE SUFFICIENT ARE FURTHER CATEGORIZED 
 
Each unit should be placed in ONE of the following 8 categories.  That is, only one of the 






28. Factual (Snjfact: 1 = yes; 0 = no) 
The expert refers to pieces of evidence drawn directly from trial without elaboration 
to support the opinion choice  
 
29. Narrative (Snjnarr: 1 = yes; 0 = no) 
The expert uses evidence to construct a possible narrative consistent with evidence 




30. Importing (sjimpor: 1 = yes; 0 = no) 
The expert compares the evidence with real world knowledge or ‘common sense’, 
thereby making the evidence more supportive of the opinion choice 
 
31. Credibility (sjcred: 1 = yes; 0 = no) 
The expert evaluates the source of the evidence and concludes that the evidence is 









32. Nonjudgmental – factual (dincnj: 1 = yes; 0 = no) 
The expert refers to pieces of direct testimony alleged to be inconsistent with the 
opinion being discounted (refers to evidence “missing from the case”) 
 
33. Judgmental – importing (dincjud: 1 = yes; 0 = no) 
The expert uses real world knowledge or ‘common sense’ to support the argument 
that the particular evidence is inconsistent with the verdict choice 
 
Discounting of evidence 
 
34. Judgmental – importing (Dunjimp: 1 = yes; 0 = no) 
The expert compares the evidence to real-world knowledge or ‘common sense’, with the 
outcome that the evidence is judged to be less supportive of verdict choice  
 
35. Judgmental – credibility (Dunjcre: 1 = yes; 0 = no) 
The expert evaluates the source of the evidence with the outcome that this evidence is 







Appendix E: Minimal Groups Questionnaire (including Tajfel Matrices) 
 
You will now be asked to distribute your resources to others. You are required to do this by 
using a matrix, and deciding which strategy you will use. You are not allowed to give 
money to yourself, instead you will send the money to members of your group and to 
members of the other group. You will then place the amount of money in the envelopes 
given to you by the researcher. If you are in Group A, for example  
 
Here is an example: 
 
In-group Member  10 20 30 40 
Out-group 
Member  40  30  20  10 
 
If you chose the second matrix, you would place $20 in the envelope for the member of your 
group and $30 in the envelope for the other group member. Please remember to circle the 
matrix. 
 
Please circle the column representing your distribution choice: 
 
 
Matrix 1         
         
In-group Member 50 45 40 35 30 25 20 15 
Out-group Member 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 
 
 
Matrix 2         
         
In-group Member 25 30 35 40 45 50 55 60 
Out-group Member 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 
 
 
Matrix 3         
         
In-group Member 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 
Out-group Member 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 
 
 
You will now have money leftover. This money can be either used for future research 
studies, or can be returned to us.  Please indicate how much money you would like to be 











Please circle the choice indicating your agreement with the following statements: 
 
1. How wealthy do you feel? 
 
        1                   2                  3                   4                    5                     6                   7  
Not at all                                                                                                               Extremely 
Wealthy                    Wealthy 
 
2. How powerful do you feel? 
 
        1                   2                  3                   4                    5                     6                   7  
Not at all                                                                                                               Extremely 
Powerful                    Powerful 
 
3. How happy do you feel as a member of your group? 
 
        1                   2                  3                   4                    5                     6                   7  
Not at all                                                                                                               Extremely 
Happy                                  Happy 
            
 
4. How at ease do you feel as a member of your group? 
 
        1                   2                  3                   4                    5                     6                   7  
Not at all                                                                                                               Extremely 
At ease                            At ease 
 
5. How satisfied do you feel as a member of your group? 
 
        1                   2                  3                   4                    5                     6                   7  
Not at all                                                                                                               Extremely 
Satisfied                    Satisfied 
           
 
6. How vulnerable do you feel as a member of your group? 
 
        1                   2                  3                   4                    5                     6                   7  
Not at all                                                                                                               Extremely 







Please answer the following questions by circling the number indicating your level of 
agreement with the following statements: 
 
1. Overall, my Group (A or B) has very little to do with how I feel about myself. 
 
        1                    2                   3                    4                    5                     6                   7  
Strongly                                  Strongly  
Disagree          Agree 
 
2. The Group (A or B) I belong to is an important reflection of myself. 
 
        1                    2                   3                    4                    5                     6                   7  
Strongly                                  Strongly  
Disagree          Agree 
     
 
3. The Group (A or B) I belong to is unimportant to my sense of what kind of person I am. 
 
        1                    2                   3                    4                    5                     6                   7  
Strongly                                  Strongly  
Disagree          Agree 
    
 
4. In general, belonging to my Group (A or B) is an important part of my self-image. 
 
        1                    2                   3                    4                    5                     6                   7  
Strongly                                  Strongly  
Disagree          Agree 
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